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CRA.PI'D I

INTRODUOTION
!his thesis proposes to analyze Ralph Waldo Emerson's
conoept 01 skeptioi.m and his dootrine of the infinitude
of the private man in terms of what each i8 in itself and
how eaoh relate. to the other.

Initially, the nature of

Emerson's skeptioism will be studied.
of this analysis, the infinitude

!hen, in the light

do~trine

will be examined.

A oonclusion as to their relationship will be offered.

A

summary of the argument will tollow.
The investigation ot Emerson's oonoept ot skepticism
and his infinitude dootrine has brought the writer to gripe
with the following materials.

the major eSBays in which

Emerson has dealt with the problem--in the main, "Circles,"
"Experience," "Montaigne, or, The SkeptiC," and "Fate",
the corresponding Journals and, in 80.e oase., portions of
the Journals which do not correspond in time but do in
subjeot matter, i.e., a note upon a subjeot pertinent to
skepticism that ia delivered in later years purely as an

1

2

afterthought but i8 in itself illuminating, and, lastly, the
appropriate soholarship written in the area.
As to the history, the truth and falsity, of the problem
presented, no exaot comment can be made as no history of the
precise nature of the problem has been located.

A study of

Emerson's skepticism--not, however, of his infinitude theory-is Oharles Lowell Young's Emerson's Montaigne (New York,

1941).

A study that approaches Emerson's doctrine of the

infinitude of the private man is J. O. McOormick's "Emerson's
Theory of Human Greatness,·f !!.! England Quarterly, XXVI
(September, 195'). 291-314.

Neither study deals essentially

with the subject matter of this paper.
Charles Lowell Young's Emerson's Montaigne is in the
main a biographical study of the life and prinoiples of
a man who in depth contributed to Emerson's conoept of
skepticism.

Chapter-wise, Young deals with llfontaigne sep-

arately as man, writer, moralist, and skeptic.

He devotes

an additional ohapter to"Emereon'e Acquaintance with
Montaigne."

This study will differ from Young's in that

it shall be concern.ed primarily with Emerson' s notion of
skepticism and shall be concerned with Montaigne's concept
only insofar as it sieves through Emerson.

Where !'oCormiokts study differs from the immediate one
is in its devotion to an enumeration and disoussion of those
persons in history Emerson thought notably superior and
in its detailed examination of many of the roots in history
of Emerson's ooncept of greatness.
not historioal.

It is expositional.

of Emerson's philosophical belief.

The immediate study is
It explains one portion
It alludes to history

only when, in the mind of this writer, an explanation of
the historical root of an idea that Emerson had serves to
illuminate the idea itself.
Since there can be located no single, unified, detailed
exposition of either Emerson's concept of skepticism or of
his doctrine of

the infinitude of the private man, and

since there oan be looated no study of the relationship
this writer finds to exist between these two areas of
thought, the purpose of this paper is to explain these areas
of thought and to point out the relationship that exists
between them.

CHAPTER II
SKEPTICISM:

"OIRCLES" AN"D "EXPERIENCE"

Of Ralph Waldo Emerson's major essays, there are four
which, in the main, are detailed presentations of that
author's concept of skepticism.

They are "Circles,"

"Experience," "Montaigne, or, 'l'he Skeptio," and "Fate."l
Each essay offers an aspect or aspects of Emerson's skeptical thought; and each, while a unit in itself, intertwines with and supplements the skepticism of the other.
The function of "Circles" in the text of Emersonian
skepticism is that of a prologue, for, in c1aiming·that
"permanence is but a word of degrees, .. 2 the essay posits
in introduction a basic principle that ribs that body of
skeptical thought which its trio of companions embellishes
and develope.

1stephen Whioher, ed., Seleotions from Ra~~~ ~aldo
Emerson (Boston, 1957), pp. 168-178, 25~4'
-301,

"0-352.

2Ra1ph Waldo Emerson, "Cirolee,1f in Ibid., p. 168.
Emerson adds: "OUr globe seen by ~od is a transparent
law, not a mass of facts."
4

5

One cannot deny that the "essay shows signs that Emerson
at the time of writing was appreciably unsettled.""
was, however, more than unsettled:

He

he was, or was coming

to be, preoccupied with the negative import of the flux in
nature that he, in prior moments of indefatigable optimism,
would have found easy to ignore.
voice of this gruwing unrest: 4

nCircles," then, is the

"Circles" is single among Emersonian essays-single in its daring. Brief passages in other
essays dare as much, but nowhere else is the
animating principle ot a discourse so venturous. • • • The ttflux ft has been much dwelt upon,
but one doubts if the realization ot the plastioity ot the universe (in distinction from the
mere slipperiness ot the personal life) has
ever elsewhere reached the point attended in
"Circles."
The lack ot permanence that Emerson sees in "Circles tt
is resident in no speoifio area 01 lite.
existenoe tlits and meanders.

Everything in

"Nature ever flows, stands

"stephen Whicher, Freedom and Fate (Philadelphia,
195.,). p. 97.
--40scar W. Firkins, Ralph Waldo Emerson (Boston, 1915),

p. 188.

6

never still.

Motion or ohange is her mode of existenoe. u5

'Nothing--nature, man, nor knowledge--is stable. Nature
has uno fixtures"t 6 the univeree always eddies in a vortex.
Man is without brim, he never fille with

knowled~e.

New

thought at every moment enters existence;7 yet to be born,
ultimate knowledge will never be oonoeived:

"Every ultim-

ate fact is only the first of a new series.

Every general

law only a particular fact of some more general law presently to disolose itself.

There is no outside, no enclosing

wall, no oiroumference to us.,,8

Everything in 1ife--nature,

man, knowledge--both enjoys and endures a spinning existenoe.
and to this spinning existence the wise man rivets hie

5Ralph waldo Emerson, Journals of Ralph Waldo Emerson,
eds. Edward Waldo Emerson and Wildo !merson Forbes (~oston,
1909-1914), V, 494.
6Emerson, "Circles," p. 169.
7Ibid., p. 171. "The last chamber, the last closet,
he must reel was never opened, there is always a residuum
unknown, unanalyzable. '!'hat is, every man believes that
he has a greater possibility."
8 Ibid., p. 170.

7

attention. 9
As an essa.y, "Circles ft does more for the body of
Emersonian skeptioism than Berve as a mere introduotion.
~ot

only does it oontain the soil in whioh Emerson's

skeptioism begins to take root, but the essay also, in
what is necessarily miorooosmio fashion, deals with the
nature of the skeptioism itself.

For in "Ciroles" Emer-

son first assays a problem tha.t he will oonsider in more
oomplete terms at a later time.

namely, the true tone

of a valid skepticism.

so, he gives the reader

In

doin~

one view of what he believes the real, the actual skeptio
must bet 10
And thus, 0 circular philosopher, I hear some
reader exclaim, you have arrived at a fine

9Emerson, Journals, X, 238. As late as 1868,
Emerson, still fascinated by the oiroles of nature's
existence and the obligation of man to them, said, uOur
little oircles absorb and oocupy us as fully aa the
heavens; we oan minimize as infinitely as maximize t and
the only way out of it i8 (to use a country phrase) to
kick the pail over, and acoept the horizon instead of the
pail, with celestial a.ttraotions and influences, instead
of worms a~d mud pies." (Ibid.)

-

l°Emorson, '·Circles," p. 176.

8

Pyrrhonism, at an equivalence and indifferency
of all actions, and would fain teach us that
if we are true, forsooth, our crimes may be
lively atones out of which we shall construct
the temple of the true God. • • • But lest I
should mislead any when I have my own head and
obey my own whims, let me remind the reader
that I am only an experimenter. Do not set
the least value on what I do, or the least
discredit on what I do not, as if I pretended
to settle any things as true or false. I
unsettle all things. No facts are to me saored,
none are profane, I simply experiment, an endless
seekar with no Past at my back •.
Here, Emerson, with a "fresh consciousness of impermanenoe in his own thought,,,ll immediately disallows his oritics
the negative possibility of equating his oonoept of the
skeptic with their interpretation of it as the scoffer.

Emer-

son wants very muoh to establish the legitimaoy of his skeptio,
and this aocomplishment, as shall be seen, he achieves to a
greater degree in

"~~ontaign.eJ

or, The Skeptic. tt

In "Circles, It

however, Emerson quite seriously informs hie audience that

llWhicher, Freedom and Fate, p. 94. Of Emersonts state
of mind ai this time, WtiIclieF0'6servesl "Numerous indications in Lsome of his most interesting essaysJ and in hi.
journals, betray his disturbed awareness that the pattern
of his first conviotions is undergoing an unforeseen modifioation, and that the various truths he has oome to recognize are in radioal and permanent oonflict with eaoh other."
(~.)

9

the skeptic is not, by neoessity, a pessimist.

Nor, by

the same token, Emerson asserts, is the skeptio neoessarily
an optimist.

For Emerson, the skeptio in essenoe is an

experimenter, an unsettler:
sees.

one who waits, watohes, and

And at this time, Emerson is ardently oonvinced of

the validity of his position.
If in "Oiro1es" Emerson has, so to speak, prepared
the reader with an introduotion for the soope of the skeptioa1 thought that is in the remaining three essays yet
to evolve, he has in the second of them, "Experienoe,,,12
delineated the oharacter of man, the individual, who will
come to grips with this

skepticis~

and has itemized the

many problems he will face in the thick of his traffio

with it.

For it is in "Experience" that Emerson asserts

that man knows "that the world [he converses] with in the

l2F~ederick Ives Oarpenter, Emerson Handbook (New
York, 1953), p. 62. On the literary aspects ot "Experienoe,'·
Oarpenter states: t'Although 'Experience' seems to have
been written spontaneously and at white heat, its struoture
is carefully planned and its development olear and logical."
(Ibid. )

10

city and in the 'lams, is not the world [he] thinks,"l3
that the theory of life has no actual twin in its practice,
and that man must forever be faced with cosmetics and not
reality.
In 'tExperience" Emerson discusses and explains the
Lords of Life.

Of the extent of their oontribution to

his skeptioal mood, it has been noted that "now he finds
that the self on which he would rely is governed by an
incongruous set of oonditions whioh he oan neither reooncile nor control."l4
Emerson believed that each Lord waa an active agent
in eaoh man'. lite.

Each Lord manifested itself in an

individual's life in a variety of ways, and each appeared
to no two men in exaotly the same fashion.

This condition,

l3Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Experienoe," Selections from
Waldo Emerson, ed. Stephen Whicher (~oston, 1957),
p.
3. On this differenoe in his mind between the world
as it is and as he thinks it, Emerson adds. "One day I
shall know the value and law of this discrepance. But I
have not found that much was gained by manipular attempts
to realize the world of thought. Many eager persons successively make an experiment in this way, and make themselves
ridiculous." (~.)
Ral~~

l4Whicher, Freedom and

!!!!,

p. 111.

11

Emerson divined, caused eaoh man to interpret life in his
unique manner, and, as suoh, it denied all possibility of
any universally homogenous interpretation.
Emerson first explains, then lists, the Lords of Life.
He claims that he can give them no specific order as they
are but a "fragment of me" and "I am but a fragment'" 15
"Illusion, Temperament, Succession, surfaoe, Surprise,
Reality, SUbjeotiveness,--these are threads on the loom
of time, these are the lords of life.

I dare not assume to

give their order, but I name them a8 I find them in my
way. "
Emerson olarifies his idea of the Subjectiveness16 of
each man through his personal assertion of eaoh mants
individuality, whioh, he believes, is displayed in two
distinot areas.

namely, man in his relation to nature and

15Emerson, "Experienoe," p. 272.
l6Emerson, Journals, X, 468. In his Journale,
some twenty years after he first disoussed Subjed~1veness,
Emerson turned to it onoe again: "Dangerously great,
immoral even in its violence of power. The man sees 8S
he is." (Ibid.)

12
man in his relation to man.

The substance of the former idea

is that each man first tints the universe with the hue of
his subjective existence; that he then interprets the oomposite result, and that his personal interpretation is, by
its very nature, markedly different from whatever other
interpretation a separate individual mignt offer. 17
To explain to his reader the latter idea--man in his
relation to man--Emerson speaks metaphorically.

He refers to

the individual man as a globe, and, for illustrative purposes,
asks the reader to imagine two globes juxtaposed. 18
There will be the same gulf between every me and
thee as between the original and the pioture.
The universe 1s the bride of the soul. All
private sympathy is partial. Two human beings
are like globes, whioh oan touoh only in a
point, and whilst they remain in oontaot all
other points of eaoh of the spheres are inert,
their turn must also oome, and the longer a
partioular union lasts the more energy of appetenoy the parts not in union aoquire.

---_.---l7Emerson, "Experienoe," p. 271. ttl have learned
that I oannot dispose of other people's faots, but I
possess suoh a key to my own as persuades me, against all
their denials, that they a.1so have a key to theirs." '
(Ibid.)
l8 Ibid ., p. 270.

1'3

One man's aotual knowledge, then, of any other man is as
minute and transient as the globes whioh kiss at a pOint
and rotate away.
In further explanation of the Subjeotiveness of eaoh
man, Emerson offers his ooncept of sin.

As it appears in

"Experienoe," the oonoept is m.ore detailed than the remark
he made in his Journal.

MSin is when a man trifles with
himself, and is untrue to his own oonstitution. u19
Sin in the sinner, Emerson claims, differs when it
is Tiewed, first, by the sinner himself and, second, by
an observer of the sinner. 20 For the sinner, his act
is merely an "experiment."

For the observer of the sinner,

however, the aot remains the traditional evil it has always
been.

IVhy

this disorepanoy exists, Emerson explains, is

due to the point of view in each man.

The sinner views

sin from the intellect and, therefore, considers it a

19Emerson, Journals, IX, 20.
2°Emerson, "Experienoe," p. 270. "We believe in
ourselves as we do not believe in others. We permit all
things to ourselves, and that whioh we oall sin in others
is experiment for us. tt (Ibid.)

14

mere "diminution,

01"

less", whereas, the observer of the sinner

views the other man's sin from the oonsoience and,
result, finds it "bad."

8S

a

It is, however, quite possible

that either point of view might exist in either the sinner
or the observer.

The saint when be sins does not view his

sin from the intellect.

Rather, be views it from the conscienoe

and, as can be expeoted, feels sad.

Emerson feels thet sin

viewed from It-the oonsoience, and not the intellect [!esults
in a] confusion of thought;" and feels that this "confusion"
provides an additional barrier between individual men and
that the Subjeotiveness of eaoh individual is thereby
increased. 21

One explanation links this matter with Emerson's status 8S a mystic. 22
rlysticism denies the real 1 ty of "evil" in the
conventional sense, and Emerson's interpretation was fundamentally that of the mystic.
Of course neither mysticism nor Emerson denies
the reality of what men call nevil" or the
reality of the feelings of pain and sorrow
which accompany ,the phenomenon of "evil" in
21 Ibid., p .. 271.

22Carpenter. pp. 14'-44. Carpente~ speaks of Emerson's
personal attachment to the idea: "Emerson, himself, like
all mystios, had lived through many long years of pain and
tragedy and developed his philosophy as B. result • • • • "
(Ibid.)
,

15
individual human experience. But both deny
the justioe of calling these "evil." They
interpret "evil" from the point of view of God
or of humanity as a whole, rather than from
the point of view of the individual man suffering what he imagines to be evila the pain or
death of the individual man of a nation may
rather contribute to the development of humanity or of the life prooeas 8S a whole. The
obvioua faot that it i8 diffiou1t for an indi'vidual to look upon hia own pain and death with
godlike equanimity explains the unpopularity
of the mystical interpretation of evil, but
in no way invalidates it.
For Emeraon, then, the problem of sin playa no small
part in the relations of men.

It is a barrier, a definite

barrier, and does not admit of faoile oollapse:

"For

Emerson--8s the haunting overtones of 'Experienoe' intim-

.

ate--it is a problem which can be optimistioa11y resolved
only after the most desperate of inward struggles and only
after attaining a serenity almost stripped of emotion. n2 '3
Surface, another of the Lords of Life, Emerson views
in

t'!!O

ways.

He sees in it both evil and good.

It is evil

in that through Surfaoe no penetration to Reality, a fellow

2'Robert E. Spiller, IJiterary Fisto;,;y of the United
states, I (New York, 1948), 35~.
-- ---

16

Lord, can be realized.
can ema.sculate Surfaoe:

Not even grief, a major emotion,
tiThe only thing grief haa taught

me is to know how shallow it is.

That, like all the rest,

plays about the surface, and never introduces me into
reality, for the contact with whioh we would even pay the
costly price of sons and lovers. • ••

I grieve that

grief can teach me nothing, n.or carry me one step into
real nature. n24
But if Surface shoulders man away from reality and,
as a result, hinders man's grasp of life, it nevertheless
possesses, in Emerson's eyes, an element of positive
worth: 25
I compared notes with one of my friends who
expects everything of the universe and is
disa~pointed when anything is less than the
best, and I found that I begin at the other

24nmerson, "Experienoe, t. p. 256. Emerson speaks
of the grief he felt at the loss of his son: "Grief too will
make us idealists. In the death of my son, nor more than two
years ago, I seem to hRve lost a beautiful estate--no more,
I cannot get it nearer to me. 1f (Ibid.)
25 Ibid., pp. 262-26,. Emerson adds. "I aocept the
danger ana-jangle of oontrary tendenoies. I find my acoount
in sots and bores also. They give a reality to the circumjaoent picture which suoh a vanishing meteorous appearance
can ill spare. ft (Ibid.)

17
extreme, expecting nothing, and am always
full of thanks for the moderate goods. • • •
If we will take the good we find, asking no
questions, we shall have heaping measures.
Tbe great gifts are not got by analysis.
Everything good is on the bigbway.
Like its peer surfaoe, Illusion, another of tbe Lords,
has the power to block man from Reality.

"Oolor is illusion,

you say, but how know I that the rook and the mountain are
more real than its hue and gleam."26
Illusion first hindered man when he oame to realize
that he existed.
man's fall.

This knowledge, olaims Emerson, oaused

For when man learned that he existed, he began

immediately to distrust the knowledge disolosed by his
intellect and by his senses. 27 No longer did man know
with certitude that the objeots of his .nvironment actually

26Bmerson, Journals, IX, 264.
27Emerson, "Experience," p. 269. On the fall of man
and his distrust of the senses. "It is very unhappy, but
too late to be helped, the disoovery we have made that we
exist. That disoovery is oal1ed the Fall of Man. Ever
afterwards we suspect our instruments. We have learned that
we do not see directly, but mediately, and that we have no
means of correcting these colored and distcrting lenses whioh
we are, or of oomputing the amount of their errors." (Ibid.)

18

existed.

He began to believe that all things were "sub-

jective phenomena" and mere "ehadows"s28
The first illusion that is put upon us in the
world is the amusing miscellany of colors,
torms, and properties. Our education is through
surfaoes and particulars. Nature masks under
ostentations sub-divisions and ~anitold particulars the poverty ot her elements, and the
rigid economy ot her rules. And, 8S infants
are preoccupied wholly with surface differences,
80 multitudes of adults remain in the infant
or animal estate, and never see or know more.
That Emerson, then, tound Illusions vexatious cannot be
denied.

His Journals, as well as his more popular essays,

attest to that.

But as to the exact extent ot his disturb-

anoe with them, there is some doubts

"This endless sequen.ce

ot illusions, it it did not leave Emerson quite undisturbed,
did not move him so deeply

8S

perhaps it ought to have done.

He tound the secret of this illusory energy of nature in
necessity, the necessity
objects.·,,29

for fa succession of moods or

No &atter, though, the exact degree of effect

28Emerson, Journals, X, 12,.
29Charles Lowell Young, Emerson's Montaigne (New
York, 1941), p.

'5.

19
Illusion had upon Emerson; its existence certainly aided
the temporary reign that skepticism enjoyed.
Temperament, another Lord of Life, should not be
explained only in itself; for, when it is explained as one
portion of the oomplex of experienoe to whioh all of the
Lords contribute, it serves to illumine their interrelations:
"what is experienoe?

• • •

governed much by temperament,

It is a series of illusions,
8S

to their oharaoter in

eaoh individual, and if deoeptive, yet eduoative.

It is

a movement through moments and surfaoes, wherefore it is
wisdom to make the most of ever.y moment, to accept the
condition temporarily existing and to live always with
respeot to the present."30
Temperament in itself, however, no lees than Illusion,
deoreasee the tenability of oertitude and inoreases the

30George Edward Woodberry, Ralph Waldo Emerson (New
York, 1926), pp. 133-134. Ralph t. Rusk oalls attention
to Emerson's method in this respeotl "What has been too
muoh ignored is that his most charaoteristio ideas were
deeply rooted in experienoe and were the fruits of the
empirical method, which, as he believed, he never wholly
abandoned." "Emerson and the stream of Experienoe,"
En~lish Journal, XLI! (April, 1953), 181-187.
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legitimacy of skepticism.

It is especially vicious in its

dealing with man inaofar as it greets him from the guise
of other persona.
exception.

strangers or friends provide no actual

T'emperament can manifest itself in anyone.

"There is an optical illusion about every person we meet.
In truth they are all oreatures of a given temperament,
whioh will appear in a giv.en oharacter, whose boundaries
they will never pass, but we look at them, they aeem alive,
and we presume there ia impulae in them."'l
Similar in effect to other Lords, Temperament clouds
the 'intellect and attempts to brake all prop,resa toward
Reality:

"'T is a great misfortune'of certain tempera-

ments that they are by their own force or too muoh determinaticn, thrown out of all sympathy, and are therefore,
inoonvertible. • • • Arguments appeal to bystanders, to a

,1Emerson, "Experience," p. 258. Emerson evidenoes
his disgust with youth in this matter. "We see young men
who owe us a new world, so readily and lavishly they promise,
but they never acquit the debt, they die young and dodge the
acoount, or if they live they lose themselves in the orowd.'·
(Ibid.)
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world of bystanders, masses of opposing faot, all is wasted,
tt is only oil to flame, only mountains of confirmation to
their insanity.,·'2

Nevertheless, Emerson maintains that

if it 1s used correctly, and if the faoulty of the reason
(the exaot nature of which will be later discussed) 1s used
to capacity, the intellect can and should, in no small
measure, debilitate the prowess of the Temperament.'3
The last of the llords, Suooes8ion'4 and Surprise, like
Surface, are at once impedimentary andsdvantageous.

They

act as impediments in that they encourage the activity of

,2Emerson, Journals, IX, 222.

"A.J. Kloeomer, "Intellect and the Moral Sentiment
in Eme1!"son t s Opinions on the Meaner Kinds of Men,·t American
Literature, XXX (November, 1958),
Kloeckrier polnis
out that in the essay "Experienoe" Emerson believed that the
temperament was vulnerable to the faculty of the reason, he
further asserts that Emerson lost this idea 8S time progressed.

'22-,,8.

8,_

'4Emerson, Journals, V,
Emerson on the subject
of SUccession: "Sucoession, division, parts, partioles--this
is the oondition, this the tragedy of man. All things oohere
and unite. Man studies the parts, strives to tear the part
from its oonnexion, to magnify it, and make it a whole. He
sides with the part against other parts; and fights for parts,
fights for liea, and his whole mind beoomes an inflamed part,
an amputated member, a wound, an offence." (Ibid.)
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Illusion; and th.ey serve as Advantages when, through their
efforts, Illusion 1s made slightly more palatable than if
Sucoession and Surprise did not exist.
Suooession parades marching Illusions before tbe mind
of man; yet it stifles the additional evil of ennuis 35
The seoret of the illusoriness is in the necessity of a suooession of moods or objects • • • •
This onward triok of nature is too strong for us.
• • • When at night 1 look at the moon and stars,
I seem stationary, and they to hurry. Our love
of the real draws us to permanence, but health of
body oonsists in circulation, and sanity of mind
in variety or facility of aS80ciation. We need
ohange of objeots. Dedication to one thought is
quickly odious.
Surprise, like Succe8sion, serves to promote variety
by allowing the ohance occurrenoe to upset the accepted order
of knowledge that exists in, and often stultifies, man's
world.

"Cbemistry, astronomy, surprise all the time, and

the appointed way of man from infanoy to omniscience is
through an infinite series of pleasant surprisese"36

3SEmeraon, "Experience," p. 259.
36Emerson, Journals, IV, 123.
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I

I

Surprise, too, oauses man to formulate a new order of
knowledge that will prevail as aooeptable until the next
Surprise ooours.

stagnant design is, as a result, appre-

oiably avoided:

nHow easily, if fate would suffer it, we

might keep forever these beautiful limits, and adjust ourselves, once for all, to the perfect calculations of the
kingdom of known oause and effect. • • • But &hI presently
comes a day, or it is only a half hour, with its angel whiepering,--whioh disoomfits the conolusions of nations and
years. • • • Lite is a series of surprises, and would not be
worth taking or keeping. it it were not ....37
The Lords of Life listed .and their prowess explained,
Emerson, a"t the end of "Experience," registers a plea for
an interpretation of life that, in addition to harboring
the acoepted beliefs of society, will quarter the skeptioisms

37Emerson, "Experience," p. 265. On SUrprise,
Emerson addsl "Nature bates calculators, ber methods are
saltatory and impulsive. Man lives by pulses, our organic
movements are suoh' and the ohemical and ethereal agents
are undulatory and alternate, and the mind goes antagonizing on, and never prospers but by fits. We thrive by
casual ties [chance occurrence~. OUr ohief experienoes
have been casual." (1!!!.)
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Emerson ho1det'S
In liberated moments we know that a new picture
of life and duty is already possible, the elements
already exist in many minds around you of a
doctrine of life whioh shall transcend any written
record we have. The new statement will comprise
the skeptioisms 8S well as the faiths of society
and out of unbeliefs a creed shall be formed.
For skeptioisms are not gratuitous or lawless,
but are limitations of the affirmative statement,
and the new philosophy JRUst take them in and m.ske
affirmations outside of them, just as much as it
must inolude the oldest beliefs.
Skeptioism, then, at this junoture of his 11fe, remains
for Emerson

~

very necessary and very valid conoept.

not, however, remain so for long,

8S

the

ess~

It does

"Monta1gne,

or, !be Skeptio" reveals.

,8Ibid.,

pp. 268-269. Emerson notes his general oonoept
of faitn-at this point. He speake of it in terms of aocepting
the moral sentiment. the important thing is not so muoh what
one believes conoerning the "immortality of the soul," but
that one has experienoed the "universal impulse to believe."
(Ibid.)

CHAPTER III
SKEPTICISM:

" MONTAIGNE, OR, THE SKEPTIC" AND tfFArE1f

The tone of Emersonian skepticism, as it is developed
in ttr,~ontaigne, or, The Skeptic, ttl is, perhaps, best summarized by two statements from the author's Journals.

It should

be remembered that the essay itself was written "in the latter
balf of 1845",2 and that the first of these statements was
recorded in August of 1845, the latter some nine years later-in May of l854--when, supposedly, Emerson's skepticism had

lMark Van Doren capsulized the relationship of Emerson
to ~~ontaigne I Emerson tlloved Montaigne for that aspect of
his skeptiCism which made him not so much a believer in
nothing as a believer in all thin~s--an insatiable seeker
after life in eaoh of its innumerable things • • • Montaigne
gave Emerson a significant idealism." tlEmerson, Ralph Waldo,"
Diotiona~ of American Bio~ral~t ed. Allen Johnson and Dumas
Malone,
1'New York, 19.,1, .,.
2ihicher, Selections from Emerson, p. 493. Whicher
points out that tt~ontaigneJ or, The Skeptic," written late
in the year 1845, was first read in Boston on January 1,
1846. It was given as part of a course that Emerson was
teaohing. Preparation for the essay, Wh10her maintains,
Emerson got from his reading of Cotton's translation of
Montaigne. He stresses, however, that the doubts expressed
in the essay are Emerson's own and not merely a reoording of
Hontaigne's. <rill.)
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spent itself.
of probity.

'!'he firsts

"We expose our skepticism out

Well, we meet, then, on the ground of probity,

not of skepticism.'"

'l'he seoond:

"We affirm and affirm,

but neither you nor I know the value of what we say."4

The

import here, then, is that Emerson believed that he met his
environment with integrity and did with it what he oould,
never knowing the actual signifioanoe of his aotions.
then, is the skeptioal tone ~f his mind. 5

'!"his,

In tfMontaigne; or, The Skeptio" Emerson's acoomplishment is threefold.

Initially he charaoterizes the kinds of

men who exist and cites their preoooupations.

Seoondly, he

bears witness to the emergenoe of the skeptic from the ranks
of men.

And thirdly, he oonstructs and, after much delibera-

tion, destroys through invooation of the moral sentiment,

'Emerson, Journals, VIII, 8'.
'Ibid., p. 466.
5young, p. 26. "It is likely enough, or more than
likely, that Montaigne had .erved rEmereon] in defining the
skeptioal habit of mind or in formrng his own notion of that.
But it is his own notion, l •• s complete than Montaigne's,
whioh he sets forth • • • the doubts and negations are not
~}ron taigne t s.
They are tho se , rather, whioh Emerson had ga thered from his own thou~ht or experience, and wished to dispose of,
assigning them to the skeptioal type of mind." (Ibid.)

27

the pavilion of thought upon which the skeptio stands.

With

this debunking, Emerson's flirtation with skepticism ceases,
and he returns revitalized to his ooncept of

~od

within man,

his belief in the infinitude of the private man.
How Emerson in the first plaoe became entangled with
the skeptioism he eventually denounoes in the Montaigne essay
is a prooes8 subjeot to 80me oonjeoture.

One 'interpretation

would have us believe that Emerson's ourtsy to skeptioism
resulted from his wanting "to learn from the skeptios, the
rationalists, and the scientists a common sense basis for
moral truth. H6 Another view, however, appears to be more
validl 7
Just as Emerson had personified his revolutionary
ambitions in the hero-type of the soholar, so now
he puts his doubts of the soholar's faith into the
mouth of the skeptio. By thus oreating a fiotitious
"alter ego" to whom to attribute his more dangerous
thoughts, Emerson could relieve himself of respons-

6spiller, p. '62.
7Wh1cher, Freedom and Fate, p. 11,. Whioher defines
Emerson's skeptioism as-w& more than half-serious experiment in a metaphysics of empiriciSM prompted by a bankruptoy
of transoendentalism." (~., p. 114)

28

ibility for them and yet at the same time give
them expression. The doubts of the skeptio
remain his own, however, detaohed, his skepticism is his most oonsidered summary of his
transcendentalism. The name he Rave it shows
his continued faith, yet his conoern with it
equally reveals the adjustment to faot that
his faith was undergoing.
The faot, then, that Emerson, if only for a transient
moment, was gripped by an honest skeptioism is undeniable.
It is interesting to note his workings with it.
When in the grip of his

skeptio~sm,

Emerson maintained

that the majority of men reside in either of two categories.
Man was either a genius or a man of mere talent. 8 If he
was a genius, Emerson, at times, referred to him as an
abstraotionist, if he was a man of mere talent, he was
otherwise known as a materialist.

Emerson often used varied

8Ralph Waldo Emerson, ttJ.Hontaigne, or, The Skeptic, tf
Selections from Ra1lh Waldo Emerson, ed. Stephen Whioher
~Boston, 19;7); p.84.
Emerson offers this distinotion.
"Eaoh man it! born with a predisposition to one or the other
of these sides of nature. • •• One olass has the peroeption
of differenoe, and is oonversant with faots and surfaoes,
oities and persons, and the bringing oertain things to pass,
--the men of talent and aotion. Another olass have the peroeption of identity, and are men of faith and philosophy,
men of genius. tf
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terms for the same subject interchangeably.9
Of the nature of the ~enius,lO Emerson speaks frequently
in his Journals.

As early as 1824, the author records,

"Profound knowledge is

~ood

but profound genius is better,

because • • • in the end, when both have arrived at the same
amount of knowledge, the latter is much the riohest 1:SiC]7.
They have not only a certain sum of intelligence to get, but
a great expedition to perform."ll

Again, as lat. as 1872,12

9J • O• MoCormick, "Emerson's Theory of Human Greatness,"
New Enfl8nd Quarterly, XXVI (September, 1953), 291-314.
MaCorm ck explains a familiar Emersonian tactio--the use of
sundry synonyms. "Hero," "Great Man," and "Greatness" are
all synonyms for "Genius. 1t Notes McCormiok, tlHe would leave
more precise definitions to pedants."
lOIbid. p. 296. On Emerson's oonoept of genius: ft • • •
he [Emer80~ offers a definition 01 genius in very fine lettering • • • genius is trueness of sight; • • • is the man Who
can describe simply and with proper words the phenomena of
natur....
llEmerson, Journals, I, 312. MoCormick (p. 298)
adds that false genius is possessed by the individual the
publio calls genius. that true genius is not made so by man,
but by God; and that "all true genius is moral and humble."
l2Emerson, Journals, X, 467. No exaot date is given,
but the possible year span here i8 1862-1872.

'0
Emerson speaks in this way about the same subjeots

~Genius

delights in statements which are themselves true, which
attack and wound any who oppose them."l'
Tbe genius, then, is the man ot thought.

He is the

individual who 8ssails the Lords of Surfaoe and Illusion,
pierces them, and comes to grips with the ideas of things.
He is a man glued to the Infinite, the Absolute, the
Real ,14
Tbe genius is a genius by the first look he casts
on any object. • • • In powerful moments, his thought
has dissolved the works of art and nature into
their causes, so that the works appear heavy and
faulty. He has a conoeption of beauty which the
sculptor oannot embody. Picture, statue, temple,
railroad, steam engine, existed first in an
artist's mind, without flaw, mistake, or friction,
which impair the executed models. • • • It is not
strange that these men, remembering what they
have seen and hoped of ideas, should affirm disdainfully the superiority of ideas.

l'Ibid ••
14Emerson, "Montaigne, or, The Skeptic," pp. 284-285.
Emerson addsl "Having at some time seen that the happy soul
will oarry all the arts in power, they [Geniuse!7 say, Why
oumber ourselves with superfluous realizations? And like
dreaming beggars they assume to speak and aot as if these
values were already substantiated." (Ibid.)
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Not only, however, is the genius the man of thought.
He is also allied to the unified nature of nod in suoh way
as to warrant prematurely some mention of his kinship with-in some cases his identity with--the individual who is a
practitioner of infinitude.

In this respect, it has been

noted that Emerson believed that "greatness of mind is
to be evaluated in direct proportion to the strength of the
idea of the Deity in the mind."15

Emerson oorroborates

this idea in a letter to Thomas Carlyle.

"Genius is but

a large infusion of neity, and so brings a prerogative all
its own • .,16

He oontinuesin this oorrespondenoe to oite

the genius as the voice of the mind whioh speaks in the
present and in the aotions of the future. 17 Later, however,
the link between the praotitioner of infinitude and the

l5vcoormiok, p. 293.
l60harles Eliot Norton, The Oorrespondenoe of Thomas
Carlyle ~ Ralph Waldo Emerson; II (Boston, 188~, ,'6.
l7 Ibid •• Emerson oontinuesl "It [peniu~ has a right
and dutY to affront and amaze men by oarrying out its peroeptions defiantly, knowing well that time and fate will verify and explain what time and fate have through them said."
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aotivator of the reason, the genius is most oases, shall be
examined.

Initially, the man of mere talent, or the mater-

ialist, must be examined.
As the genius is oonoerned with the Infinite, the
Absolute, and the Real, the man of mere talent, his opposite, enjoys dallianoe with only the Finite, the Relative,
and the Apparent.

This materialist finds both Surface and

Illusion amiable assooiates, and he deems worthless the
occupation of the -genius,IS
The men of toil and trade and luxury,--the
animal world, inoluding the animal in the philosopher and poet • • • and the practical world
• • • weigh heavily on the other side. The
trade in our street believes in no metaphysioal
causes • • • but stioks to cotton, sugar, wool,
and salt. To the men of this world • • • the
man of ideas appears out of his reason. They
alone have reason • • • the inoonvenience of
this thinking is that it runs into indifferentiSM and then into disgust.
Emerson speaks in his Journals on at least three separate ocoasions of the nature of the primary tool of the

ISEmerson, "MontaigneJ or, The Skeptic, f' pp. 285286. In'the Journals Emerson notes that even the man of
talent has his inferiors: "Talent without charaoter is
friskiness." (Jou.~al., V, 419)

III
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I

I

I

I,
I

materialist, namely talent.

On the first oooasion, he

oonsiders taler.t in itself.

"The talent BUoks the sub-

stanoe of the man.

How often we repeat the disappointment

of inferring general ability from oonspiouous partioular
abili ty • • • • Blessed are those who have no talent. ,.19
On the seoond and third oooRsions, Emerson oontrasts
talent with genius, ,the latter, as might be expected, is
thou~ht

superior:

"The differenoe between talent and

i
!

genius is, that talent says things whioh he has never heard
but oIloe, and genius things whioh he haa never heard.,,20
"Genius i8 power, Talent i8 applioability.
an animal, is an
genius. H2l

ap~lioability,

A human body,

the Life, the Soul is

19n9., VIII, 95.
20Ibid ., VI, '70-'71. On the same point MoCormiok
offers ?Urther oontrast. He notes, in addition to it.
moral oast, the allianoe of genius with the Divine, he
denounoes any suoh possibility with Talent, finding it
merely "intelleotual good health." Talent, he believes,
oan only glimpse the patterns of life that the genius
oonsumes. (F. '01)
21Emerson, Journals, VI, 371.
"\

\I
J

'"

J

'4
still held by the tenets of skeptioism, Emerson tests
both the man of genius and the man of mere talent.

He finds

eaoh of them guilty of false dootrine; eaoh an extremistJ
and eaoh the proponent of a rootless position.

I'

I

With regard

to the man of mere talent. the materialist, this deoision
oomes as no surprise.

With regard to the genius. the deoision

seems inoongruous only when one forgets the skeptical mood
Emerson was in at this time.

Onoe his skeptioism ebbs,

Emerson returns to revere the genius 'as the indiVidual who
most often exercises his right of infinitude.

Nevertheless,

the inoongruity of his attitude at this period in his life
has been noted:

~More

interesting, however, is his rejeotion

of the materialist's opposite number, the abstraotionist.
Emerson here takes a oommon sense view of the transoendentalist, the reformer, and men of faith generally.tt 22
From out of the skeptical confusion generated by the
existenoe of the genius and the materialist, Emerson'.

--- ----

22Whioher, Freedom and Fate, p. 113.
--~~~

i
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skeptio emerges. 2'

He is neither a man of genius nor a man

of talent, though he may well possess, in moderation, traits
of either individual.
the median of these

He i8 pruned of excess and stands as

t'RO

extremes.

"The abstraotionist and

the materialist thus mutually exasperate eaoh other, and the
scoffer expressing the worst of materialism, there arises a
third party to ocoupy the middle
the skeptio namely.

gr~und

between these two,

He finds both wrong by being in extremes.

• • • He sees the one-sidedness of these men of the street.
• • • Neither will he be betrayed to a book and wrapped in

a gown.

The studious 01as8 are their own viotims, they are

thin and pale, their feet are 001d."24

2'Emerson, t'Montaigne; or, The Skeptic," p. 286.
Emerson manifests his alienation from the abstractionists:
"If you come near them and see what oonoeits they entertain,
--they are abstractionists, and spend their days and nights
in dreaming some dream, in expecting the homage of society
to some precious soheme, built on a truth, but destitute of
proportion in its presentiment, • • • of all energy of will
in the schemer to embody and vitalize it.'· (Ibid., p. 287)

-

24Ibid ., p. 286. Emerson inveighs against the abstraotionist-an! the materialists "You are both in extremes • • •
You that will have all solid, and a world of pig-lead, deoeive
yourselves grossly. You believe yourselves rooted and grounded
on adamant; and yet, if we unoover the last facts of our knowledge, you are spinning like bubbles in a river • • • You are
bottomed and oapped and wrapped in a gown." (Ibid., p. 287)
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What Emerson believed at this time was that the skeptic
knew what the genius denied, what the man of talent ignored:
that man "cannot see.,,25

He believed that the skeptio riRhtly

realized that his philosophical ability was not unlimited.
And it must be stated here that had Emerson held this belief
forever, had he been for the greater portion of his life a
skeptic rather than a believer. and an optimist, bis theory of
the infinitude of the private man would never have been formulated.

Nevertheless, Emerson was a 'skeptic for only a short

period of time, during whioh he praised the skeptic for
seeing that "conflicting evidenoes,,26 exist and for realizing
rightfully that these conflioting evidenoes invalidate any
adherenoe to a partioular oreed:

ttl neither affirm nor deny.

I stand here to try the oase • • • Why fanoy that you have all
the truth in your keeping?

25 Ibid ••
26 Ibid ••

There is muoh to say on all
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sides.,,27
Emerson adamantly maintained that the skeptic was not
the iconoolast.

The skeptio did not, as many would have it,

shed for sheer pleasure the dogmas of anyone creed.

The

true skeptic did not flit from ohuroh to ohuroh orying
"Liar I "

Nor did he seek with probing fingers a side wound

in all religion.
was oonsider.

What the skeptio did, Emerson asserted,

"This then is the right groumd of the skeptic,

unbelief, not at all of universal denying, nor of universal
doubting, least of all of sooffing and profligate jeering
at all that is stable and good. • • • He 1s the oons1derer.
• • • Everything that is excellent in mankind, he will see
and

judge.,,28

27Ibid ••

Emerson oontinuesl

"It there is not ground for

a oandid thinker to make up bis mind, yea or nay,--why not suspend judgment? I weary of these do~atizers. I tire of these
haoks of routine. wbo deny the dogmas • • • • I am here to oon-

sider • • • to oonsider how it is. I will try to keep the balanoe true. • • • Why think to shut up all things in your narrow
ooop. when we know there are not one or two only, but ten,
twenty. a thousand things, and unlike?" (Ibid., pp. 287-288)
,

-

28Ibid., p. 289. Emerson elaborates on his philosophy of
skeptioism. He notes that it must be both pliable and strict,
pliable enough to fit man, and having fit him, strict enough
to remain with him "as a shell must diotats the arohiteoture
of a house founded on the sea." (Ibid.)
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The true skeptic, Emerson believed, would remove himself, like Addison and Steele, from the traffic of society.
would acquire lodging in the distanoe, and would, from this
point of

v~ntage,

observe what actually is and what aotually

is not.

tlNot less clearly Emerson saw, and let his reader

see, the distinguishing mark of skepticism:

the suspended

judgment, signifying that truth for the skeptio is still
to seek.,,29
There oan be little doubt that Emerson has established,
despite an imminent denial of the same, a solid existenoe
tor the position of the skeptio.

For, by his rather exaot

and defined defense of the oonsiderer in society, he makes
exoeedingly difficult to acoept the sudden dismisl::&l of
the skeptio through an

1n~ooation

of a principle:

that

prinoiple which is the synthesis of ourrent that rides between

29young, p. 20. Young cites Emerson's fa.ilure to
inolude in his ooncept a 1:m~.3io terlet of skeptioism: tlBut
there is a third element in the skeptioal attitude to life
of whioh Emerson seems scarcely to have been aware • • • the
alleged repose of mind, or complete tranquility, whioh
follows suspension of judgment • • • • n (Ibid., pp. 20-21)

'9
the faculties of the reason and the moral sentiment, whioh
is aotualized when the faoulty of the reason unites with
~od,

will be analyzed later in detail.

How Emerson justified his destruotion of hie ooncept of
skeptioism is 'Lb•. subjeot of varied opinion. 30 One interpretation suggests that "Emerson had reservations about the
philosophy of experienoe whioh he asoribed to the skeptio,
for the skeptic is of course the traditional enemy of faith.
SkepticiSM was a half-truth, it ignored the facta on which
faitb was founded."'l

Another critic asserts that "there

wa$ not a fibre of soeptioism in his whole constitution. u32
Should this last opinion be the truth of the matter, it
makes nearly impossible any aooeptab1e explanation for the

,Ospiller, It '61. Spiller explains Emerson's oonfliot
with skepticism in terms of a battle. He believes that the
"tone of penitential self-acousation" which grew in Emerson
in his early years was deoimated ultimately by the "~ativ.
optimism of his oharaoter." As a result of the trial, Spiller
believes Emerson's affirmRtion was strengthened.
'lWhioher, Freedom and

E!!!, p. 112.

'2woodberry, p. 107. Woodberry's argument holds that
"Emerson W8S dominated above his will by a faith so pure,
so absolute, so unque8tionin~ that he could hardly divide
it from his consoiousness of being."

I.
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sinoerity the essays on skeptioism evince.

Emerson wrote

too oonvinoing17 at that time in his life to be divoroed
personally and oompletely from the philosophy he then
preaohed.
One other explanation appears to be based on the most

!

Ii

valid reasoning.

It has as its oore the idea that, though

initially gripped in the skeptioal vise, Emerson was eventually able to writhe frees

"Yet Emerson was quite inoap-

able, none the les8, of maintaining the soeptioal attitude
to life as anything permanent or final. or even of entertaining a doubt except in regard to partioulars.
might go, but never faith.

Faiths

He was too inveterately affirm-

ative, in his habit of mind, ever to oome to rest in a
soeptioal suspension of judgments, or to find any peaoe in
the sceptio's peaoe.""
It is possible, then, to aooept Emerson's resignation
from the role of skeptio if one is willing to believe that
the skeptioism explained and advooated in the

"Young, p. 18.

e~says

,I

I

I
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"Ciro1es," "Experienoe," 'f~~ontaigne, or, The Skeptio," and
"Fate" is but a momentary lapse in what is otherwise an
all-pervasive and oontinuous oonoept of Emersonian belief.
Emerson's invooation of the moral sentiment would not lead
one to believe otherwise. 34
The final solution in whioh skeptioisM is lost,
is in the moral sentiment, whioh never forfeits
its supremaoy. All moods may be safely tried and
their weight allowed to all objeotions, the moral
sentiment as easily outweighs them all, 8S anyone
• • • • I play with a misoe1lany of faots, and take
those superfioia1 views which we oall skeptioism,
but I know that they will presently appear to me
in that order whioh makes skeptioism impossible.
A man of thought must feel the thought that is
parent of the universe, that the masses of nature
do undulate and flow.
Over against Emersonts words, oritioa1 opinion exists
that oannot accept as valid what it deems to be nothing
more than the author's flippant rejeotion of skeptioism.

34Emerson, "Montaigne, or, The Skeptio," p. 300.
In the Journa18 Emerson speaks in like manner. "Of the
strange skepticism of the intellect. It will not speak to
the intellectual on the platform of ethios, and that out of
a true integrity. It has strange experienoe. It knows that
it is a debtor to sin and degradation. Certainly let it do
homage in si1enoe to the Soul. But in speeoh I think it
should bravely, 8S it oertainly will with the Inte1leotua1,
own the Actual. That is sublime--to abandon one's self,
against all experienoe, to the Absolute and Good." (VII,
296)

Ii

i

42

"The refutation is brief.

Too brief.

Emerson took his

stand on 'the moral sentiment,' as he liked to call it:
and he simply held it against all the powers of negation
or of doubt. • • • It disposes of skeptioism in far too
summary a fashion."'5
The oonoept of thefaoulty of the moral sentiment,
then, is all important in Emerson's skepticism; and, as
shall be seen, it has no less importance in the author's
theory of the infinitude of the private man.

As stated

earlier, the faoulty of the moral sentiment is simply the
faoulty of the reason, actualized, the faculty of the reason
aotualized 18 simply the union of that faculty with the
Deity.

This union of the reason and the Deity, as Emerson

meant it, is not easy to conceptualize, one might 8ay, however, that the reason consumes the willing Deity, which in
turn permeates the consumer for that period of time that
the reason remains actualized.

The nature of this process

'5young , p. '6. Young maintains that Emerson's retutation of skepticism "leaves, or seems to leave, the doubts
whioh Emerson had so honestly recognized as not without
reason just where it found them."

i
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I.

i

,

will be considered in the chapter on infinitude.

What will

be considered here is the product of the realized reason,

i I

the moral sentiment itself, which at once atrophies Emerson's
skepticism and

invigo~ates

his infinitude theory. 36

A

simplified version of its definition stresses its importanoel

"Emerson came to describe the faculty whereby man

might come to explore the realm of the spirit as the 'moral
sentiment,' and most of his value judgments on men and
experience depend ultimately upon the presence or absence
of this faculty.

It ia the capacity of human nature to
discover the moral law by means of 1ntu1tion. H37
The moral sentiment, however, is more than the peroeption of the moral law by intuition.

8S

True, the reason,

Emerson would have it, intuita, rather than systematioally

36Whioher, Freedom and Fate, p. 14. Whicher notes that
the roots of the oonoept-o? ~moral sentiment are lodged in
Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, that the moral sentiment was used
against the thought of HobbesJ and that Emerson beoame aware
of the moral sentiment through his reading in college of
Dugald stewart, the Soottish realist.

'7 Spiller, p.

'70.
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approaches the moral law; but the moral sentiment does more
than this, for it is "the voice of God in the soul."38
Emerson states that he is "enlarged by the acoess of a great
sentiment, of virtuous impulse"; that this sentiment is tithe
direct inoome of God ••• 39

How this direct inoome affeots

him; how it oomes when the reason is taut; and how it leaves
when the reason is flabby has this explanation:

"By this

'union,' the Over-Soul not only fills but is the individual
soul, just as tbe ooean tide fills and floods for a time
the sballow brook flowing into it, and becomes one with it,
and then retreats again, leaving the 'brook,' the individual

"SWhioher, Freedom and Fate, p. 14. Whicher notes that
"This benevolent notion iiiintTo Emerson • • • that conscience was not to be explained naturally." Consoienoe was
the miorophone of God, through it he spoke his law, and man,
if he were true to his nature, followed it without hesitation.

(n!!. )

., 9Emerson , Journals, V, 248.

Carpenter adds that
Emerson's oonsoienoe had Puritan roots and that Emerson
transformed it into the faoulty of the moral sentiment. He
then regarded it as productive of an "axiom of all human
oonduot and psychology." (Carpenter, p. 199) Whicher
writess "God was revealed in his own soul by the best ot
all possible evidenoe, the direot experience of his own
consciousness." (Whicher, Freedom and Fat., p. 33)

------
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mind, with only a 'far-off memory. ,,,40
How and why the moral sentiment departs once it is
possessed will be considered in the discussion of the
reason, but it is well to note here that the "moral sentiment could oertain.ly inspire, but to oonquer and prev8i1
took more than ecstasy."

For "to be a doer demRnds the

knack, or charaoter, or magnetism or whatever personal
foroe it is that gives one man ascendancy over another.,,4l
As Emerson explains, "Whenever the moral sentiment is
affirmed, it must be with dazzling courage.

.18 long

8S

it i8 oowardly insinuated, as with the wish to show that

40Renry David Gray, Emer8on. A statement of New England
Transoendentalisms8 Expressed In lbe PblloS0Enl ~Its ChIef
mxP1nent (New York;-l95§), p. 5b7 ~ersonfs ver=3oUI; Imerson s God, is "the vast spiritual background of existence" in
which all being unifies. Each man, because of the Over-Soul,
beoomes a miorooosM of the universe, he has within him in
miniature "all the 1aw8 and the meaning of the whole."
William Peterfie1d Trent, et al, The Oambridge Histo~ of
American Literature, I (New'fO'ik,-r9'17), '3'35.
41 Whicher, Freedom and Fate, p. 66. Perhaps more than
the personal force of an1iidIVIaua1, his '·virtue of obedience"
to the dictates of the moral sentiment guarantees hi8 success.
C.E. Jorgenson, "Emerson's Paradise under the Shadow of Swords,"
Philological Quarterly. I I (July, 1932), 274-292.

.i
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it is just wbat the Churoh reoeives today it is not imparted
r'

and oannot be owned. ,,42
The moral sentiment has likewise been cited as the term
whioh Emerson used most frequently .tto desoribe man t s rela....
tionship to the oentral faot of spiritual law."43

In this
: I
'I

instanoe the moral sentiment is the "traditional weapon"

!

Emerson used to oppose "the spiritually limiting effect
of rationalism and empirioism ... 44 To some it appears that
Emerson used this weapon legitimately in his expulsion of
skeptioism. 45 Por others, however, doubts remains "Yet

42Emerson, Journals, X, 102. "By lowly listening,
omnisoienoe is for me. By faithful reoeiving, omnipotenoe
is for me. But the way of the soul into its heaven is not
to man, but from man." (Ibid,. V, 273)
I

'I

43X1oeokner, p. 323. George A. Gordon offers an interpretation of the relationship: "The Emerson dootrine of man is
as hard to define as the Emersonian dootrine of God, but if we
say that God is the soul of the universe and that man is the
soul that answers to it • • • we shall not be far astray."
"Emerson as a Religious Influenoe," Atlantio Monthlx, XCI
(May, 1903), 585.
44Xloeokner, p.

'2'.

45Whioher, Freedom and Fate, p. 14. Emerson oonfirms
Whioher's oontentions '·See ~many cities of refuge we have.
Skepticism, and again Skeptioism? Well, let abyss open under
abyss, they are all oontained and bottomed at last, and I
have only to endure. I am here to be worked upont" (Journals,
VII, 82)

I,

I

Iii
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in the moral sentiment

8S

he conoeived it, there is the

same sense of contact with an ultimate reality as in other
forms of mystical experience, and the same sense of making
the oontact direot1y, the same sense of immediaoy.

To the

skeptic, however, all mystioi8lll will seem to be, more than
likely, only one more i11usion.,,46
The effect of Emerson's snub of skepticism is two-fold.
If the essays devot.d to skepticism are considered in
isolation, Emerson's flight to the moral sentiment ia
inoongruous.

If they are considered, aa they ahould be,

as but one portion of the Emersonian body of thought, and
aa an unorthodox portion aa well, Emerson's abrupt change

ot loyalty from skepticism to the moral aentiment will be
eaaily understood.

Emerson could not remain the considerer.

He had to return to hia faith, the great belief in the

,8-'9.

46young, pp.
In addition, Kloeckner pointa out
that "It is doubtful whether the moral sentiment as conceived and celebrated by Emerson was by itself sufficient
to insure partioipation by all men in the good life • • • • ft
(Kloeckner, p. '28) Now, if this is the oase, Young's
argument--that the moral sentiment is inoapable of slaying
skeptioism--takes on weight.

48

Spirit of unity, the belief in the moral sentiment.
In the essay "Fate"47 Emerson further debunks the
skepticism he once, for a period of time, cherished and
held.

He again states that his refutation of the skeptioal

attitude results from his belief in the moral sentiment
or in what he sometimes terms the Beautiful Neoessity,48
the Oneness of all.

Prior to the reiteration, however,

he discusses the nature of Fate.

Essential to Emerson's

47Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Fate," Selections from Ra!,8
Waldo Emerson, ed. Stephen Whioher (Boston, 195~p.
•
This essay bas been termed Emerson's "most complete expression of • • • discriminating optimism." "Fate" states
the beliefs of "the pessimist in the strongest terms." It
lists the forces 01 nature which assail man, the laws of
nature that cannot be brought under supervision, and the
inevitable tragedies that often oocur. Nevertheless, the
"good man oonfronts the evil Fate" and wins. Samuel McChord
Crothers, ¥jlph Waldo Emerson: How to Know Him (Indianapolis, 192 ,p. 24.
- 48Emerson, "Fate," p. 351. In the Journals, Emerson
speaks of the Beautiful Necessity (the moral sentiment)
and says that "any single faot considered by itself oonfounds, misleads us. Let it lie awhile. It will find its
plaoe, by and by. in God's ohain. If (V, 79)

49

oonoept of Fate49 is the idea of limitations

"No pictu!'-e

of life can have any veraoity that does not admit the
odious facts • • • • The element runn.ing through' entire
nature, which we popularly call Fate, is
limitation.

knOWll

to us as

Whatever limits us we oal1 Fate."50 'What-

ever stands in strong oPP08i tion to, arid far beyond the
reaoh of the will is termed Fate. 51 Emerson advises that
man must acoept, but not without protest, tla great deal
as Fate. tt52 He suggests that "we are examples of Fate",

49Norton, II, 217: In a letter to Carlyle, Emerson
wrote: "I scribble always a little • • • • I did within a
year ago or eighteen months write a ohapter on Fate, which
• • • I hope to sand you in fair print. • • • Comfort yourself • • • you will survive the reading, and will be a sure
proof that the nut is not oracked."
50berson, "Fate,'f p. 3'8.
5l It i8 of 80me interest to note one observation made
upon Fatel ' "One of the ha:ppiest and most illuminating of
Emerson's definitions is thisl -Fate is the limitation of
power.'" Rudolph Schottlaender, "TWO Dionysiansl Emerson
and Nietz8che," South Atlantio Quarterly, XXXIX (July, 1940),
It would appear thit Fate unoontrolled would be
80meth inp; le S8 than hap'PY, though admi t tedly "illuminating. ft

,,8.

52Emerpon, Journals, VII. 55'.5. Soon afternard, EmeI'scn
remarked I "Fate, 'ate. Well, settle this theT"; the nobility
of the sentiment is in resisting that or in accepting it."
(~., p. 559)
.
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that we "toss up a pebble and it falls tt , that even "the
soaring of" our "mind and the magnanimity" we "indulge
will fall. n5 '
The nature of the limitation imposed by Fate is a
unique one.

For it includes and permits the existence ot

the freedom of the will within its bounds:

"To hazard

the oontradiotion,--freedom is necessary.

If you please

to plant yourself on the side of Fate, and say, Fate is
all J then we say, a part of Fate is' the freedom of man. It 54
But

the freedom is a strange one, when one considers

"the power of Fate, the dynastic oppression of Submind"."

"Ibid., VIII, 2'9. Here Emerson intimates his
eventuaT'VIotory over Fate. "'But cannot we ride the
horse which now throws us?" (Ibid.)
54Emerson, "Fate, tt p. '40. In the t.Tournals, Emerson
elaborates on the apparent contradiotion in the co-existence
of freedom and Ji'atef "Our dootrine must begin with the neoessary and eternal, and discriminate Fate from the necessary.
There is no limitation about the eternal. Thought, will,
is co-eternal with the world. And as soon as intellect is
awakened in man it shares so far of the eternity,--is of
the maker, not of the made. ft (IX, 216)

'5~., VIII, 406.
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-Underlying all is the 'power of Fate, the dynastio oppresaion of Submind.'

He r-Emerson:1 now accepts the plain faot

that moat souls belong to the world of fate, or animal
good.

Their fixed determinations are the very means by

which high nature works.

'Pr•• souls are rare, and evell in

th.m inheres an old inertia which punishes,

fit of geniality."56

a8

it were, any

Certainly Emerson believes that free

souls are rue; but, n ....el"'the1.s8, h. believe. that they
are. 57 Their numbers oonsist of those individuals wbo,
through the union of the reason and the Deity, exercise and
maintain the faoulty of the moral sentiment.

56Whioher, Preedom and Fate, p. 155. Prior to the
statement noted, ihieher-aiys iEat Emerson's notion of
fr.edom reA1l1ted from hi. "early submission to neceSSity,"
which caused him to yearn for liberty with a ferOCity
that was "all the more intense for his underlying sense of
ita impossibility." What Whicher believes is that Emerson's
later extravagant optimism emerged from this "longing for
freedom" and "the eventual realization of' 1t." (Ibid., p. 1')
57Bmereon, Journals, VIII, '11. Emerson apeaks on
the subject of :tree and pent souls. "Soula with a certain
quantity of ligbt are in exce •• , and irrevocably belong
to the moral 01a88. • •• Souls with 1 ••• light, it is chemically impos.ible that these be moral • • • thes8 belong to
the world of ~at •• • (Ibid.)

I'
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To determine the manner in which the freedom of the
will and Fate coexist is no diffioult projeot.

Their

ooexistenoe prevails onoe freedom of the will beoomes a
fact in a man; for man, from that moment knows the nature
of Pate and has, thereby, ample defense against its
assault.

The entire prooess is but one other ohannel

through which man aohieves infinitude.
destiny.

They may well fear Fate who have any infirmity

of habit and aim.
he is, has

"Reality rules

But he Who rests on what is, and what

destiny above destiny, and can make mouths
at fortune ... 58
B

Man achieves freedom of the will by activating the
"Power,,59 of the will, whose efforts can bring Fate to

58 Ibid ., IX, 199.
59Emerson, "Fate," p. 339. C.E. Jorgenson asserts
that Fate is "left a word" or defeated by the "oonformity"
to Fate of the will (p. 284). Perhaps; but it would seem
that the will would conform not to Fate itself, but to the
law of the nei ty whioh Fate obscures. The "power t• of the
will slays Fate, then conformity to the good ocours. Philip
Lovelaoe Nicoloff concurs. ft • • • Emerson held that mere
insight into the 'scientific' law and its utility was not
enough. ~Man must also ",,-r,lve his assent to the law. The
law Must beoome his will just 8S it was the will of the
universal intellect." Emerson on Race and History (New
York, 1961), pp. 98-99.
-- ---- ---

its knees:

ttThus we traoe Fate in matter, mind, and morals •

• • • It is everywhere bound or limitation.

But Fate has

its lord, limitation its limits. • • • For though Fate
is immense, so is Power, whioh is the other faot in the
dual world, immense.

If Fate follows and limits Power,

Power attends and antagonizes Fate. • • • Man is not
order of nature, saok and saok, belly and members • • •
but a stupendous antagonism.,,60
Power of the will comes into existence as a by-produot
of the prooess of evolution whereby the faoulty of the
reason promotes itself to the faculty of the moral sentiment.
Once the faoulty of the moral sentiment evolves, the limitations otherwise imposed by Fate 'Neaken, and, as a result,
man prepares for a realization of his infinitude.

Thought,

the energy the reason gives off in this transformation,
illustrates the new dominance:
oceanic one, which flows
all are its offspring:

"Thought is identical, the

hither~nd

thither, and sees that

it coins itself indifferently into

house or inhabitant, into plants, or man, or fish, or oak

6°Emerson, "Fate," p.

"9.

I

i
I

I

or grain of sand.

All are re-oonvertible into it.

Every

atom 1s saturated with it, and will oelebrate in its
destiny the same lRwa.»6l
Fate, then, as a result of the assault by the power
of the w1l1, no longer harass •• Emerson with limitation.
Rather, 1t begin8 to untold to him a greater knowledge
of his personal powera:

"The breath of the will whioh

blew through the universe eternally in the direotion 0'1
the right and necessary was now his will also, and betore
it he moved irresistibly, fated to succeed.
driven by appetite

a~inst

No longer

the 'burning wall' ot Fate,

he .ent forward to perform what he now kne. to be an
absolute good.

He acted knowingly

88

an instrument of

the 4ivinity_M 62 As an instrument of the divinity,
Emerson, "trom identifying his real self with the divine

6lEmerson, Journals, VIII, 56'. Earlier, in the
Journals also, Emerson 8aid that "'hought is nothing but
ihe oirculations made luminous. There "is no solitary
tlower, and no solitary thought." (Ibid., p. '97)
62Niooloff, p. 214. ~icoloft believee that skepticism
never had an aotual hold on Emereon, but that with the hands
of Fate it "stole what te" good hours 1t oould." As noted
previously, Niooloff believes Emerson capable 0'1 pushing
Fate aside in hie search tor the neity. (1!!!.)
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Self within him and

dismissin~

the rest as outer shell,

temporary and apparent, • • • came to recognize that his
real self was the whole contradictory nature, divine potentiali ty and mortal limits together ••,63
This function, then, of the faoulty of the moral sentiment as a pivotal point in the interaction between the
ooncept of skeptioism and the theory of the infinitude of
the private man beoomes increasingly evident when various
interpretations of the infinitude theory are brought under
oonsideration.

Similarly, a deeper impression of the

nature of the moral sentiment itself ooours when its souroe,
the faoulty of the reason, is oonsidered at length.

Both

examinations shall now begin.

6'Whioher, Freedom and Fate,p. 1o,. On the S8me point
Woodberry notes that "The sour-Knows itself 8S an effect of
which the cause is ~od." He ssserts that Emerson believed
that, in this instanoe, cause and effect were "consubstantial."
Moreover, he defines Emerson's oonoept of the soul 908 "a
partioular form of divine energy.u (P. 109)

CHAPTER IV
THE

DOCTRI}i~

OF THE nJ.FINlTUDE OF THE PRIVATE I'lAN

It is no easy task to determine with oertitude the
exact

meanin~

and purpose Emerson had when he, in his

Journals, made the :1'ollowing statements:

Uln all my

leotures, I have taught one dootrine, namely, the in:1'initude 0:1' the private man",l and "I a:1'firm the divinity of
man.,,2

The latter statement, at :1'irst glanoe, might seem

self-explanatory, but olose scrutiny 0:1' the author's work
dismisses immediately any suoh possibility.

0:1' the

IBmereon, Journals, V, 3S0. Any doubt that Emerson
was not serious when uttering thie statement should be
eradioated when the statements whioh follow it are read:
"This the people aocept readily enough, and even with loud
oommendation, as long as I oall the lecture Art. or Politics,
or Literature, or the Household, but the moment I call it
Religion, they are shocked, though it may be only the application of the same truth whioh they receive everywhere else,
to a new olass of facts." (Ibid., pp. 380-381)
2

-

Ibid., VIII, 87. Again, Emerson writes, "Who shall
an Individual? I behold with awe and delight
many illustrations of the One Universal Mind. I see my'being
imbedded in tt, as a plant in the earth so I grow in God. I
am on.ly a form of him. He is the soul of me. I can even with
a mountainous aspiring say, I am God • • • • " (Ibid., IV, 247)
Emerson has made, directly and-rnaIrectly, the same claim in
other instances.
de:1'ine~me

56
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diffioulty of the dootrine, the

followin~

has been noted:

"It is a diffioult dootrine, more nearly Christian than
pagan, but striotly neither one nor the other. • • • It
is a moment in that life whioh is at onoe human and divine.
The infinitude of the private man is a dootrine whioh makes,
or tends to make, the entire experienoe of life a religious

• • • experienoe."3
The oase for Emerson's status as a mystio is the topic
of much debate.

The opinions proferred on the plausibility

of suoh olassifioation are as many as the definitions offered
for the term itself. 4 One who believes that Emerson is a

3Young, p. 180.
4Carpenter, pp. 113-114. In situating Emerson within
its soope, Carpenter first sections mystioism into three
areas. The first area consists of those who deal in the
oocult for the sake of the oooult, i.e., the magioians or
the mediums. In this sense, mysticism is Ita term of reproach." The seoond area inoludes those who claim themselves evidence of "the doctrine that God or the ultimate
nature of reality • • • may be experienced or known in an
immediate apprehension or insight , differing from all ordinary sensation o-r ratiocination. tt Individuals who experienoe
this kind of mysticism evinoe tfeostasy" in the supernat'l.lral.
Carpenvr cl~ms that "Emerson did not describe the experienoe lPe had as radioally different, or supernatural, nor
claim persona ly to have attained it in its pure supernatural
form.'t For this reason, Carpenter says, Emerson has often
been denied tIthe title of 'mystio.·" The last area of mysticism, however, is Emerson's. Here reside those who hold that
"any type of theory assertiBg the possibility of attaining

.

I,
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mystic speaks in reference to the infinitude theory and
says that "This idea of unity or identity results directly
from the mystical experienoe of eostasy, in whioh the
individual escapes the limits of his own individuality
to feel himself part of the whole.·' 5 That suoh ecstasy
would have to occur in anyone who experienced Emersonian
infinitude seems proper to assumes

"The doctrine of the

infinitude of the private man was the point of agitation
in his thought, the flame under the pot, beoause it irresistibly suggested that the power newly disolosed within
his soul might, now that it was at last recognized, be
made to flood his whole being •

knowledge or power through faith or spiritual insight .. is
mysticism. "By this general definition," says Carpenter,
"Emerson was clearly a mystio." In the present writer's
opinion, however, Emerson's essays and Journals offer ample
evidence of Emerson's residence in the second area as well
as the third.

5Ibid ., p. 21. Carpenter notes that the soul, in
ttidentifying itself with God • • • achieves that feeling of
beatitude or unity which is the goal and reward of all
mystics." (Ibid.)
6Whicher, Freedom and Fate, pp. 46-47. On the same point
McCormiok remarks that VEmersonts theory of human greatness
plagued him all his life. If This doctrine, 1-'oCormick asserts,
was the essence of Emerson's optimism. (P. 291)

59

From study there emerge three, if not more, possible
interpretations of Emerson's theory of the infinitude of
the private man.

The first would hold, simply, that man

as an individual is in himself God.

The seoond would

suggest that man as an individual is in himself, as is
eaoh other man, one portion of a
manifest.

~od

Whom all men make

The third would contend that man as an indi-

vidual is in himself potentially God, that he becomes
truly

G~d

when he has nurtured and developed into aotual-

ity the God-potential that is, by his very nature, his.
Eaoh of the arguments wears a garment of evidenoe. the
fabric of the last, however, is of a finer, more intricate
weave.
Evidence in Emerson's work for the initial argument-that man as an. individual is in himself God--follows a
distinct pattern as does the oritioism that agrees with
it:

"The rook on which he • • • based his life was the

knowledge<:that the soul of man does not merely, as had
long been taught, contain a spark or drop or breath or

60

voice of God, it is flod. tt7
to agree:

Emerson, in his own words, seems

ttExcite the soul, and the weather and the town and

your oondition in the world all disappear; the world itself
loses its solidity, nothing remains but the soul and the
Divine Presenoe in which it lives. u8

His assertion involves

the idea that the individual is a resident in Divinity and,

Ii

more importantly, that each man ultimately is the Divinity
in which he resides.
H•••

On the same issue he speaks again:

that is one tact then, that in certain moments I have

knqwn that I existed directly trom God, and am, as it were,
his organ, and in my ultimate conscience am He. tt9
11
!

Ii

I

! I

7Whicher, Freedom ~ !!]!, p. 21.
Baalph Waldo Emerson, ttDivini ty School Address,·'
Selections from Ral~~ Waldo Emerson, ed. Stephen Whicher
(Boston, 19;7J; p.
• It might be noted that in this
address Emerson spoke of the historical aspect of the
infinitude doctrine. He attacked historical Christianity
as the shaokles of religion. (Carpenter, p. 56) What he
urged the Harvard graduates to do was to seek the new revelation--the essence of their own natures.
9Emerson, Journals, IV, 249. George Gordon notes
Emerson's method of exciting the soul. ttMan is called upon to
speak face to face with Go4 to allow the Divine Soul to awaken
the dormant faculties within him, to educate his whole being
in soience, in duty, and in worship." (P. 585) Woodberry describes the intuitive nature of the activity: ttThe :function of
the soul with regard to this divine influx is to reoeive, • • •
to give unimpeded way to the currents which stream through it.··
(P. Ill)
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On each of these occasions, however, Emerson qualifies
both the concept of the residence of man in Divinity and the
idea of the simple existence of man as God.
instance,

"'~xcite

In the first

the soul" and in the second,"in certain

moments"--these conditions, Emerson says, must first be
satisfied before man is God.

As such, the qualifying trios

of words do not enhance the first argument.
The second argument--that man as an individual is one
portion of a God Whom all men make

mani:fest-~also

has in

Emerson's work apparent evidenoe of its authenticity,

"Like

a bird whioh alights nowhere, but hops perpetually from
bough to bough, is the Power whioh abides in no man and in

ill

r,d,I

'II'
",

I I

no woman, but for a moment speaks from this one, and for
another moment :from that one. nlO
No one man,

the~,

acoording to this idea, is, or

contains entirely in himself, God, because "there is no

i,i;

I

I,
I

I

iI

I i

I'

adaptation or universal applioability in men, but eaoh

l°Emerson, "Experience," p. 261.

I'
i
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has his speoial tallent, and the mastery of sucoessful men
consists in • • • keeping themselves where and when that
turn shall be oftenest to be practioed. ttll The men who
are popularly great, not essentially great, are what they
are preoisely beoause they choose to join wills with, or
open themselves to, not the Divine Spirit as they should
but, rather, to other men who offer them the dubious reward
of a transient feeling of greatness. l2 Nevertheless, some
maintain that "the soul is identioal' in all men,tt that "its
essence is divine."l,

Others follow the same route to its

II:""'.'

llIbid., p. 260. The reader should not think that
Emerson in this instance uses the term talent in the derogat~ry sense of the man of mere talent.
The context from
which this sentence was extracted has these thou~ht8 in close
conjunctions "A man is like a bit of Labrador spar, whioh has
no lustre as you turn it in your hand until you oome to a
particular angle, then it shows deep and beautiful colors. • •
Of course it needs the whole society to give the symmetry we
seek." (~.)
l2McCormick, p. '08. "The greatest man is not man at all
for he merges his human will in the Divine and becomes the imag
of Rod." (Ibid.)
l'woodberry, p. 112. Earlier Woodberry observed that "the
soul's knowledge of God, however, is not self-knowledge." He
states that suoh lmowled~·of the Deity "is rather unfolded to
human apprehension separately and diversely as knowledge of tha
energy, not ourselves, which has self-existenoe for its ohief
trait and is operant in and upon the soul, but above it ...
(Ibid., p. 110) How all of this relates to a soul whose "essence is divine" (Ibi1., p. 112) is diffioult, this writer would
imagine, to establish.

, ,:
II:
1',1

I'~ I

farthest extreme:

pantheism.

"This

pervadin~

soul of the

universe hallows the world, hallows humanity, fills nature
with beauty, fills society with radiant meaning, and overwhelms all finite forms, natural and human, with infinite
life, light, significance, beauty, and joy.H 1 4
Additional support for this seoond argument emanates
from Emerson's idea of the effeot of compensation15 upon
the "double oonsoiousness" of mant 16
One key, one solution to the mysteries of
human oondition, • • • to the old knots of Fate,
freedom, and foreknowledge exists: the propounding, namely, of the double oonsciousness.
A man must ride alternately on the horses of his

14nordon, p. 585.

On Emerson's attitude toward pantheism, Whioher remarks that "he is faoed with a choice
between two varieties of pantheism." These are "pancosmism,
the identification of God with the totality of things" and
"acosmism, the denial of the reality of anything except God."
Ultimately, Whioher says, Emerson Hin great part • • • avoided
either one. tt (Freedom!!!!!! Fate, p. 31)
l5'Noodberry, p. 129. "Emerson's name for this indifferency in circumstanoes is the law of compensation • • • •
The divergence, the separation, the opposition, are only
apparent; life is an integration of the two elements, and
the law of compensation lies in the necessity of the integration. Man oannot have a part, but must take the whole
• • • the sweet [and] the bitter." (Ibid.)
l6Emerson, ttFate,tt p. 351.

i
"

I
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private and his public nature • • • • To offset
the drag of temperL~ent and race, which pulls
down, learn this lesson, namely, that by the
cunning co-presence of two elements, which is
throughout nature, whatever lames or paralyzes
you draws in with it the divinity, in some form,
to repay.
Man, therefore, according to the second argument, would
be, in Emerson's eyes, other than pure Divinity.

He would

be more than a voice for the thoughts of a separate nod.
He would be, in effect, "human", and, as such, he would be
subjeot to frailty, compensation for whioh he could gain
through a oomprehension and realization of the Divine portion of his dual nature.

As haa been noted, "For a few

years , , • compensation played an indispensable part in
furthering Emersonts emancipation from sceptioism and
8elf~distrust'

the assertiOn of a law of compensation is

the first major offensive aotion in his private battle
with Fate.,,17

l7Whioher, Freedom and Fate, p. 37. Whioher opines
that "The notion of an auiomitIC moral oompensation, nevertheless, is without question the most unacceptable of Emerson's truths, and a major cause of his present decline of
reputation." (Ibid.)
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As stated previously, neither of these initial arguments adequately explains Emerson's statement on the infinitude of the private man.
any, that brings lights

It is the third argument, if
Emerson believed that man was poten-

tially God, that he beoame God when he employed to capacity
those personal powers of his nature that were geared to
the fruition of each man's God-potential.
The significanoe of Emerson's oonoept of Natura 18 in

I

i!
IIII,,!
'I

l8Lauter pOints out why it is difficult to pin down
Emerson's conoept of Naturel If • • • I think we may say that
'in each use of ,'Nature' • • • Emerson means something complex,
something of which we cannot know the full import until we
have studied many ooourrenoes. For while the orbed meaning
subsists in Emerson's mind at all times, only one or another
aro is likely to appear clearly to us in any given instance."
P. Lauter, 'trrruth and 'Nature. Emerson's Use of Two Complex
Words,·t EntliSh Lite~ HistoH' XXVII (Maroh, 1960), 70.
Another noe on the 81!1~lty 0 Emerson's "Nature lf is made
by Carpenter. He states that in the essay Emerson sought
"to express a new philosophy of life all at once, and it
is not surprising that he failed. It The essay itself. Carpenter says, "ohallenged attention if it evaded definition."
(P. 52) If Lauter and Carpenter found ambiguities in "Nature,"
Thomas Carlyle did not. Emerson mailed him a copy of the
essay, and Carlyle replieds "Your little azure-colored 'Na~e'
gave me true satisfaction. I read it, and then lent it about
to all my acquaintanoe that had a sense for such things. • • •
You say it ,is the first ohapter of something reater. I call
it rather the Foundation and Ground plan [sic on whioh you
may build whatsoever of great and true has-oien given you to
build.", (Norton, I, 112)

, I

I
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relation to the theory of the infinitude of the private man
is not easily pinpointed.

Even in isolation, the Emersonian

ccmoept of Nature as depioted in "Na.ture"
faoile explanation.
underestimated:

~l.1arantees

no

Nevertheless, its value has not been

tiThe primary assumption of this essay is

that man, when regarded individually or generioa1ly, is the
starting point of all philosophical speou1ation.

His func-

tiona, his relations, and his destiny are its only oonoerns.
• • • Whatever truth lies beyond or outside man can be
reaohed only through him and by him.,,19
In the majority of his moments, Emerson viewed Nature
as a positive good, in the minority--name1y, in his da1lianoe
with skepticiam--he found Nature inimical.

It is easier,

in reference to the infinitude theory, to explain the former
rather than the latter view, though both oan be explained.
Ultimately, however, it must be remembered that no matter
the strength of Emerson's outlook at a given moment, the
following always, in one way or another, prevailed,

19 Spiller, p. '369.

ftNature

fl
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is tWO-headed.

Invoked, or uninvoked, God will be there.,,20

When Emerson viewed Nature

8S

a positive good, he held

that its physioal properties--the wooded area, the solitude
afforded therein, the flower, the resident beauty--that
these properties formed a "proj eotion of God, t. 2l an "exposi tion of the Divine Mind. ,,22

I',

i:

He believed that ·'benefi t

is the end of natur. u ,2, that "air, water, sun and moon,
stone, plant, animal, man, devil, disease, poison, war,

!.I

'i!
I

20 Emerson, Journals, V, 2'8. J.W. Beach attacks
Emerson for invariably viewing "Nature all too blandly
throu~h the ~es ot the 'mind,' reading it in the light .t
'innate ideas' and all hoary preconoeptions ot 'idealism.'"
He berates Emerson. tor not admittin~ that his mind may have
"something to learn from Nature, from the world whioh it
finds given to it from without • ., "Emerson and Evolution,"
Universitl ~ Toronto Quarterly, III (July, 19'4), 474-97.

,I

I,i

I

21Emerson, Journals, IV, 76.
22Ibid •• Spiller notes the distinotion Emerson made
between the man and Nature and how the latter relates to
Divinity. He does 80 in terms of Emerson's Me and the Not
Mel "The Me is consciousness, or that part of man which
partake8 of divinity, the Not Ve is the objective ot consciousness, that with whioh the Me is in relation. But
Nature, or the Not Me, also partakes of divinity. • •• Its
reality lies in its being 'a projection of God in the unoonscious.'" (I, ,69)

2'Emerson,
, Journals, V, 28.

.
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vioe.,24_-that these "all serve ... 25

He believed, in essenoe,

that nature served man in all respeots:

UReally the soul

i8 near thing8, beoause it is the oenter of the universe,
so that astronomy and

~ature

and Theology date from where

the observer stands.

There is no quality in Nature's

vast magazines he oannot touoh; no truth in soienoe he
oannot see; no aot in will he oannot verif'y,--there is
where he stands.,,26
Emerson believed that "the relation of' the soul to
Nature[was]parallel to its relation to God, in that there
[was~ identity between the two and also operation of one

upon the other ~d that] the funotion of nature [jas] to

'I:
i.,
1;1

unfold the soul i:whioh it aooomplishe~ by virtue of the
J ,I
"

24Ibid •• Again Emerson, in the Journal., makes evident
his amazement at'the multiplioity of' existence and, what he
implies in this instanoe but ultimately recants, its indeoipherability. "Just 88 man 1s oonscious of' the law of' ve/(etable and animal nature, so he 1s aware of an Intelleot which
overhangs his oonsoiousness 11ke 8 sky, of de~ee above degree;
and heaven within heaven. ~umber is lost in it. Millions of
observers could not suffice to write its first law." (VI!I,
567)
25 Ibid ., V, 28.
26 Ibid ., VI!I, 22.

1'1
':1:
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perfeot oorrespondence of Nature to the soul.,,27

When in

this mood, Emerson held that God and Nature were merely
two aspeots of a single spirit,28 and that at times this
single spirit was diffioult to disoern, as Nature was "in
oontinual flux ••• 29
That Emerson did not always oonsider Nature a magnif-

I

, I

,Ii

ioent oornuoopia haa already been seen in the disoussion
on skeptioism.

When he believed Nature to be other than

1,1','

,"1

I,

omni-benefioial, he found that it sealed man in an envelope
ef distraotions, and that these distractions tended t.
27 Woodberry, p. 11'. Emerson adds, ~But it is the Life,
it is the incoming of God by whioh that Individual exists.
• • • When that Divine Life shall have more riohly entered
and shed itself abroad in him, he will no longer plead for
Life, he will live." (Journals, V, 497)
28Trent, p. '48. In addition, Spiller notes the transcendental "idealistic view of the universe as an embodiment of
a single oosmio pw,yohe, now manifesting itself as man, now as
nature, and aohieving through the interaotion of the two in
history its own secret intent • • • • " Man, in this instanoe,
would be but a fragment of the world psyohe. (I, 350)
29Emerson, Journals, V, 377. How Emerson beoame immune
to the unprediotable ?IUx of Nature he notes in his Journals
when he states that the "detaohed faot is ugly. Replace it
in its series of oause and effeot and it is beautiful. Putrefaotion is loathsome; but putrefaction seen as a step in the
circle of Nature, pleases." (~., p. 54)

,
,I
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obstruct any advance man
his Divinity.

mi~ht

make toward a realization of

In his skeptical period, Emerson dubbed this

role of Nature as oppressor "Fate" and discussed it at
length,

88

great

we have seen, in an essay by the same name.

For man to realize his quest, i.e., a knowledge of his
divinity or infinitude, he had to learn, Emerson believed,
the nature and structure of the hierarohy of his powers
and had to aocede to its plan by convincing his faculty of

'II

i'

the understanding that its province was not one of interferenoe with the functions of the faculty of the reason.
The reason had its prerogatives, and the understanding had
to subordinate itself to them.

Emerson had this idea of

rank in mind when he states that "Heaven is the exercise of
the faculties • • • • .,30

There 1s no question that for

Emerson this exercise would constitute heaven, but the
exercise would have to be a proper one geared to the plan
the faculties, by their very nature, dictate.

'0-Ibid.,

VIII, 571.

,.

,I'
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Prior to any intimate discussion of Emerson's concept
of the reason and the understanding, and the function of
each in man's quest to realize his infinitude, it would
seem proper to give some mention to (though it is not in
the province of this paper to discuss at great length) the
historical sources--the people and the thoughts--that fed
Emerson's mind with regard to each faculty.

It is, of

oourse, no great revelation to state that the individuals
cited as influential in Emerson's personal idea of the
reason and the understanding were influential also in the
formation of other of Emerson's beliefs and tenets.
In what is admittedly an oversimplification, it may
be asserted that the roots of Emerson's ooncept of the faoulties of the reason and the understanding were hooked in
the soil of German Romantioism; that their stems, prior to
their flowering in Emerson's mind, were bent somewhat in the
wind of English Romantioism.

In short, German thought passed

through English minds before halting in Emerson.
themselves, mostly German and always Nordio, ares

The roots
Kant,

GOethe,3~chleiermacher, Fichte, Schelling, Sohiller,

31Trent, I, ;;2. MoCormick observes that after 18;6
Emerson's appraisal of Goethe was ~e~erally positive. Emerson
"recoA'Ilizes the pervasiveness of Goethe's influence and he
can write in 18;7 that Goethe has affected all reoent works

I

I,

I'i
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Leibniz, Hegel,32 Richter,33 Swedenborg,34 and Spinoza. 35
The English Remantics of influenoe, in the main, are:
Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Carlyle,36 with the latter two
the most influential.

Other influences, from a variety

of genius, because no young man can read Goethe 'without
finding that his own compositions are immediately modified
by his new knowledge.'tI (Fp. 296-297)
32Rene Wellek, "Emerson and tle;rman Philosophy, ,. New
England Quarterli' XVI (1943), 54. "The TranscendentiI'Ists
were merely look ng for corroboration of their faith. They
found it in Germany, but ultimately they did not need this
confirmation. Their faith was deeply rooted in their minds
and their own spiritual ancestry. n (~., p. 62)
33Edwin D. Mead, "Emerson and Carlyle,1f The Influence
of Emerson (Boston, 1903), p. 220. Mead notes that Emerson
contaoted Richter's thought through Carlyle. (Ibid.)
34Clarence Hotson, "Emerson and the Swedenborgians,tf
Studies in PhilolOgy, XXVII (July, 1930), 545. Hotson
observes~hat Emerson made at least sixty allusions in his
Journals, oorrespondenoe, and published works to Swedenborg
and his disoiples. (Ibid.) Van Doren oites Swedenborg as
the source of Emerson~etaphY8ioal approaoh to nature, of
his diffioulty with the oonneotion between the mind of man
and the phenomena of nature, and of man's position at the
oellter of nature. (F. 135)
35wellek, p. 53.
36Trent, I, 332. Edwin Mead adds that Emerson, in 1833,
the year after his resignation from the ministry, visited
Carlyl., whom he had been reading for five years. (F. 164)
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I

of areas, have also been noted,37 and there is every likelihood that many of these bear the same relationship to
~erman thou~ht

as they bear to Emersonian doctrine.

i

I

~I

!

Emerson, then, for the most part, used the English
Romantics as filters for Germanic thought.

Coleridge is

primary in this regard, especially as to the distinction
between the reason and the understanding, and shall be later
discussed.

Wordsworth and Carlyle, though not as influen-

tial with regard to the concepts of the reason and understanding , were nevertheless of influence on Emerson and
helped bring to fruition many of his ideas.

A helpful

comparison of the thought at Wordsworth and Emerson'8
perhaps capsulizes their similarity and difference in
these . statements:

nPor each of them, God • • • penetrates

'7YcCormiok, p. 301. McCormick includes "Gerando's
colleotion of pre-Platonic philosophers; the neo-Platonics;
a moral theism from Thales and Anaximander; a statement of
the unreliability of the senses from Xenophanes; concept of
unity from Pythagoras, of unity in the midst of diversity
from Heraclitus." (Ibid.) F.I. Carpenter, in turn, asserts
that "perhaps the mo~mportant and certainly the most
unusual influence on Emerson • • • was the literature and
philosophy of the ancient East... (pp. 110-111)
38John Brooks Mo,,~e, "Emerson on Wordsworth, tf PT,rJA,

XI,I (March, 1926), 179-192.

Ilill,l
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and interpenetrates nature, an Essence everpresent.

Emerson,

from the first, adds that this soul is not simply ever present
--it is already within us, as well.,,39
Carlyle was an important influence

~n

several ways.

He interpreted for Emerson, though to a lesser degree than
did Coleridge, the ideas of Yant. 40 He held, as did Emerson in his period of skeptioism, a fluctuating concept of
GOd,41_-fluctuating, that is, between the concepts of a

'39 Ibid ., p. 191.

40carpenter, p. 224. Carpenter comments .that Emerson
"adopted the transoendental terminology of Coleridge and
Kant to describe as 'reason' what was essentially 'oonscienoe' guided by religious intuition." (Ibid., p. 198)
Rene i,Vellek adds that "Emerson thought of Kant 8S the originator of intuitionism, but was mainly interested in his
philosophy." (P. 46) A.J. Kloeckner, in turn; points out
that Emerson, throughout his work, no matter his love of
intuition, many times said that he "could not unequivocally
rel,. on intuitions or first thoughts." (P. 327)
41Henry E.J. Bevan, "The Religion and Philosophy of
Thomas Carlyle," Transactions of the ROfal Society of Literature, XXVI (1905), 22'. As-aiffrcUl as it is to-systematize Emerson's thought, Carlyle's is no less 8 challenges
"It has been said that you oannot reduce Carlyle to a system,
and that is true. His teaohing is usually antithetioal. At
one moment he argues violently for black, at another for white,
and he leaves you to reconcile the two pOSitions as best you
may." (Ibid., p. 212) Bevan could easily have been speaking
of Emerson-In this instance.
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personal and an impersonal Being.

More importantly, Carlyle

brought Emerson to Goethe, as Coleridge brought Emerson to
Kant; and he

and was suooessful in bringing Emerson
to a perusal of some fifty-five volumes of Goethe!s work. 42
ur~ed,

Finally, in 1838, Emerson oollected, wrote an introduction
to, and had published in America the essays of Carlyle, who,
in turn, prefaced and had published in England Emerson's
first volume of essays.43
De8pite the general acceptance of the idea that Emerson's Germanic influenoe sieved through English minds, the
possibility of his obtaining the same at its origin, in
some cases, has been noted.

Emerson owned a copy of an

1838 translation of the Critique of Pure Reason, in the
}f"'rancis Haywood translation, which is ··still preserved in
his library at Concord ~nd] shows pehcil markings" that

42Mead, p. 224.
4'Ibid., pp. 181-185. Edwin ?~"'ead believes that "the
editing of 'Sartor Resartus t and Carlyle's Essays may be
regarded as the beginning o'f Emerson's own literary career."
(Ibid., p. 184) Carpenter notes the unique friendship between
tne-iwo. They bickered about a number of things but were
steadfast friends. Whereas Carlyle gave Emerson inspiration, Emerson supplied two of Ca.rlyle' s ~reate8t needs:
admiration and faith. Their friendship, strangely, thrived
on the air of disagreement. (pp. 25-27)
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Emerson is believed to have put there. 44

Nevertheless,

it is believed that Emerson "learned from Coleridge

Kant's

distinotion of Reason from 'Understanding" and that Emerson's
ooncept of the same is really "Kant • • • as misunderstood
by Coleridge.,,45

What Emerson has done to the Coleridgean

distillation of Kant i8 little better:

"Emerson grows

partioularly reokless when eohoing Coleridge's distinction
between understanding and reason, whioh he handles with a
looseness going far beyond anything possible to Coleridge.
He has been muoh impressed with Coleridge's derivation of
, II

understanding from the mere senses, whioh makes it unreliable

I'·,

and inferior.,,46

44 Wellek, pp. 44-45.
45 Ibid ., p. 47. Robert Spiller a.dvises tha.t Emerson "in
his own-eaFly thinking • • • did not clearly distinguish between the logical and the intuitive roads to truth." He says
that Emerson owed to Coleridge this distinction but that tlit
was not to beoome clear to him until his spirit had been
melted and forged." (I, ,62)
46Joseph W. 'Beaoh, The Conoept of 11ature in Nineteenth
Poetry (New vork;-r9~6), p. ;19. Beacn-assertsthat
while ~erson "sometimes misses the metaphysioal implications"
of the thou~hts he derives from Colerid~e, he reaches the same
praotical result as Coleridge--Ita spiritual anthropomorphism
in the interpretation o~ scientifio&ta, a disposition not so
much to be guided by the facts in building up theories, as to
read a human (and religious) meaning into the facts." (Ibid.,
p. '26)
' "
Cent~
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Other Kantian concepts tha.t Emerson received in
vitiated form were "the Kantian proofs of immortality, the
existence of

~od,

• • • the freedom of the will • • •

and the subjectivity of time and apace ... 47

~~any of these

he doubtless received from his reading of Coleridge:
"He was reading. Coleridge's Aids to Reflection and Priend
~--

in 1829--8 year before discovering Carlyle--and for the
next seven years Coleridge remained perhaps the most important single influenoe on his litera~ life. n48
That Coleridge influenoed Emerson, then, in the Kantian concepts of the reason and the understanding is cerII

tain, eve11 though the precise extent of such influence is
impossible to ascertain.

For "There can be little doubt

that Coleridge introduoed Emerson to the terms 'reason'
and 'understanding' as he used them in the technioal
senses • • • and that coleridge fixed the distinotion

47wellek, p. 47.
48Carpenter, pp. 223-224.
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between them in his mind. n49

It is, therefore, important

to understand the nature of thought in this area that
Coleridge gave Emerson, since the latter's concept of
the reason and the understanding bears so heavily upon
his theory of the infini t'lde of

the private man.

Coleridge believed that the faculty of the reason
existed only in man; that the

u~derstanding

existed both

in man and in. animal s (in which case the understanding was
termed "instinct"), that reason, by its nature, was superior to understanding; and that for it to function properly,
the reason had first to come to a realization of its im!:1en.se
powers. 50 Once such powers were realized, the reason became

49"~.R. Davis, "Emerson's 'Reason' and the Scottish Philosophers," !',;ew En~la:nd Quarter1!, XVII (June, 1944), 211-212.
Robert Spiller ad s on tne dist nction: "Similarly the distinction found in Coleridge and Emerson alike, between the
Resson and the Understanding • • • could express and justify
the TrBnscendentalist~ desire to retain both the mysticism
of the 'past and the empirioism of the present, and to assign
eaoh a sphere in experience proper to its character." (P. 350)
F.T. Thompson adds that after "having established the distinction between the Understanding and the Reason, Emerson
proceeds to show first the function of the Understanding in
the discipline of the mind, and second the funotion of the
Reason in the moral realm." "Emerson's Indebtedness to
Coleridge," Studies in PhilolOgy, XXIII (January, 1926), 68.
50Charles Richard Sanders, Coleridge and the Broad Churoh
Movement (Durham, N.C., 1942), p. 35.
------
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the operative means by whioh man came to study spiritual
truth; with suoh powers unrealized, any efforts by the
reason in this area proved futile.
reason ever

beca~e

lfuether, however, the

operative by this act of faith in it-

self had no bearing on the prese!loe or absence of the
faculty itself in every man. 5l It always existed in man,
whether in a state of activated certainty or complete passivity.
The understanding, as a faoulty in man, Coleridge
thought impaired as its utility was debilitated by its
inability to disoern spiritual truths

the understanding

oould deteot only material evidenoe and could not, as
could the reason, deal perceptively with spiritual truth.
The understanding, however, was not a oompletely inutile
faoulty; it supplemented the reason in ita work whioh, to
be acoomplished, required the oooperation of all of the
faoulties of man. 52
The reason itself Coleridge believed to be of two

5l Ibid ••

-

52samuel Taylor Coleridp.:e, "The Friend," The com~lete
Works of Samuel Taylor COlerid,a, ad. #.n.T. Snead, I (New
fork, TS84), 164--8S cited in bid., p. 43.
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the speculative reason and the practical reason. 53

types:

The goal of speculative reason was abstract truth; the
goal of practical reason was the moral truth and will of
man. 54 While not oblivious to the value of the speculative
reason, Coleridge found the practical reason to be of more
worth to man in that it provided him with a mean of

~idance

according to which he might, rightfully, deterInine the
course of his life.
In summary, it may be said that

Colerid~e

held to be

true three basic tenets of belief regarding the faculty of
the reasonr

that the reason revealed to mar the Highest

Truth, rrod; that it revealed to him a knowledge of the
basic unity in God of all proximate truths; and that it
provided man with the ability to realize the importance
Ultimate Truth must have upon the application and direction of his life. 55 This faculty of the reason existed
in every man, supplemented in its work by the more mundane

5'3Samuel Taylor Coleridge, "Aids to Reflection," in
Shedd, II, 241-42, as cited in Ibid., p. 47.

54 Sanders, p. 47.
55 Ibid., p. 48.

-
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faculty of the understarding.
An apparent paradox that is common to both Coleridge
and Emerson in their individual concepts of the reason
and the understanding is the nature they asoribe to eaoh.
The faculty of the reason, for them, has not the charaoteristics ordinarily predioated of it.
the faoulty of the understanding.

And neither has

Coleridge and Emerson

both believe that the reason is an intuitive faculty and
the understanding a logioal one. 56 The ordinary conceptions of these faoulties, of course, is just the reverse.
Knowledge sweeps easily, like a tot on a waxed slide,
into the properly oonditioned reason; it resists the understanding and, as with the stray crumb and the assiduous
ant, must be dragRed away by the faoulty which seeks it.
Davis provides a orystallized oomparison of the two
faoulties:

56spiller, p. 354. Spiller continues: "The third
assumption • • • is that intuition and imA~ination offer
a surer road to truth than abstraot logic or scientifio
method. It is a corollary to their belief that nature
is organio, and oorresponds to the teohnioal distinction
between the reason as intuition and the understanding as
logical analysis. 1t (Ibid.)
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The reason is here represented as a faculty of
the mind that functions by revealing or perc,eiving intuitively and not by a syllogistic
or lo~ical process of reasoning. It is eternal
or farsighted, and gives to man his 'first
thoughts' of youth, his love of the beautiful
and the good • • •• The understanding, on the
other hand, is a faculty of the mind that
functions by comparing, contriving, adding,
and arguing. It is tempQra1 and near-sighted,
denies the assertions of reason, oold gives to
man rules of custom and self-interest fO~7the
care of the body and animal life • • • •
Emerson's version of the distinction provided by
Coleridge between the reason and the understanding is similar
to the distinction itself in a number of ways.58

Each argues

that "the Understanding belongs to the mass" and that ttit is
the faculty which • • • arranges phenomena."

Each believes

that, in the active sense, which is, for Emerson, its
existence as the faculty of the moral sentiment, "the
Reason is possessed only by a few" and that it uis necessary

57navis, pp. 210-211. In the sermon "The GenUUle
Man," Emerson contended that "there is this supreme universal reason in your mind which is not yours or mine or
any man's, but it is the spirit of God in us all." A.C.
Mcfliffert, ed., Young Emerson Speaks C:ew Vork, 19'38),
p. 186.
58MoCormick, p. 299.
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for the intuition of the ultimate ends.,,59
his tTournRls, elaborq,tes:
standing.

If

Emerson, in

The City delights the Under-

It is made up of finitiesl

matical lines, all calculable.
of successions, of oontrivanoes.

short, sharp mathe-

It is full of varieties,
The Country, on the

contrary, offers an unbroken horizon • • • of vast un.iform

ii
I~
"

plains, of distant mountains • • • the objeots of the road
are few • • • the eye is invited ever to the horizon and
the clouds • • • • It is the school of the Reason.,.60
Coleridge did not believe--and Emerson agreed with
him--that the faoulty of the understanding was devoid of
value.

Coleridge stressed the true funotion of the under-

standings

its ability to serve the reason in subordination,

59Ibid •• In the Journals, Emerson typifies his conoept of~ funotion of the reason when be oontrasts it
wi th the understanding: t'Reason, on the other hand, oontents himself with animatin~ a olod of clay somewhere for
for a moment, and through a word withering all these [obstruotions erected by the understand in#!] to old day cobweos. tt
(V, 13)
60Ibid., pp. 310-311. On the reason, Whicher adds,
"The gr~emancipating privilege of oontemplation was the
sight of God through Reason, or better, the union with God.
sinoe the mindts 'vision tis not like the vision of the eye,
but is union with·the things known." Freedom and Fate,

p.132.

..

--

'I,
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to complete, in this sense, the prowess of the reason.

Emer-

son saw as the understanding's basic achievement its'sbility to help man acquire an appreciation of the singular
beauty of an individual object.

More than this, however,

the understanding could not accomplish.

It could not, as

could the reason, unite the individual manifestations of
nature.

But this is not to say that the understanding

would always remain within the limits prescribed by its
nature, Emerson comments on this in his Journalsl

tiThe

Understanding, the usurping understanding, the lieutenant
of Reason, his hired man,--the moment the Master is gone,
steps into his plaoe; the usher commands, sets himself to
finish what He was doing, but instantly proceeds with his
own dwarf arohitecture, and thoroughly oheats us, until
presently for a moment Reason returns, and the slave obeys,
and his work shrinks into tatters and oobwebs.,,6l

7'.

6lEmerson, Journals, IV,
A.J. Kloeckner would
oaution one to avoid the idea that "beoause a man's reason
oan lead,Q1 man, to the right, all he says is right. tt (P.
Osoar Firkins disagreesl "Man errs, but the Reason
is infallible. Man sins, but the Reason finds sin merely
negative. Man dies, but the Reason is deathless. To senses
nature is absolute; to the Reason it is prOVisional." (F.
320)

-m)
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Emerson believed that only the aotivated reason, the
faoulty of the moral sentiment, could peroeive God in the
unity of existence and could allow Him to enter and permeate man.

For if man attempted suoh peroeption with the

understandin~

alone, he labored futilely with but "half

his foroe. ,,62 . Due preoisely to suoh misguided erldeavors,
Emerson believed "the world·' lacked "unity" and was "broken
and in heapse,,63

The problem was that "Understanding

possesses the world • .,64
The aotivated reason, it has been noted, stands in
the Emersonian system as the singularly effective foe of
Fate, whose constrictive nature, for a time, nourished
Emerson's transient skeptioism, and which, in so doing,
constructed rature's best barrier against man's reali-

62EmersQn, "Nature," p. 54.
6'Ibid ••
64Emerson, Journals, V, 13. On the understanding Emerson oontinues: "I+' fortifies itself in History,
in Laws, in Institutions, in Property, in the prejudice
of Birth, of Majorities, in Libraries, in Creeds, in
Names." (Ibid.)

1

1,1
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Batien ot hi. infinitude.

The jurisdiotion ot the moral

sentiment in this area i8 more deeply impressed when
Emerson'. m.taphor tor the prooe •• the reason undergoe.
in its transter to the ••ral .entiment is oonsidered.

In

it, Emer.en piotures Fate as a hoep whose axle i8 man.
!h. meral sentiment, the 8tretohed faculty of the reas.n,
i8 the gathering .f .poke8 that,

~.m

the axle to the he.p,

aecure Pate to man in what is tor hi. a knowledge-gaining
relationship.
hoop'a aro. 65

Via the spoke., man trac.s eaoh inoh of the

!he funotion of the activated rea.on in the realm of
man'. que.t tor infinitude i. illumined through comparison to it. previously disou88ed function in the realm of
skepticism.

Pate, whether oonsidered .s the friend of

akepticism or the f •• of infinitude, remain8 the aame.

65Emer80n, "Pate," p. '51. Whicher comment. on Emer80n'. per80nal problem with Pate. "!o take the leap into
greatneaa he had to overc••e two radical difficultie.. the
1ncon88Cutiven••• of hi. own moods, the impossibility of
per.evering the moment. in whioh he telt hi. unity with the
power within him' and the neoe.sity .f dealing with an eut8ide world that remained obdurately independent of hi8 will."
Freedom and Pate, p. 60.

I'li
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"Whatever limits us .e oa11 Pate. • ••

The limitations

refine as the soul purifies, but the ring of necessit"
is always perched at the top. • ••
impassable by any

in.i~ht

of man.

The limitation is
In ita last and lofti-

est asoensiona, • • • freedom of the will is one of it.
obedient membere. n66
As with Emer.on's skeptioism, the mastery of Fate over
the infinitude of the individual man is eliminated by the
power of the will.

As the faculty of the reason prepares

for the reception of the Deity through its evolution into
the faculty et the moral sentiment. the power of the will,

the natural child of this evolution, &ccosts and emaaoulate.
Fate.

Therefore, sinoe Fate's ability to block man from

infinitude reaides in its exi.tence aa "unpenetratea oau.ea H ,67
and sinoe the combined assault of both the power of the will--

which in preparation for the reception

of the

»eitT

clears

.way obstaol ••--and the faoulty of the reas.n--which funotions

67 I},id., p. '44.

ee
now a8 the moral sentiment, the faoulty through whioh the
Deity arrives--Fate, a. in the oa.e of Emer8on's skeptioism,
10se8 ita effioacy.

Emerson de80ribes the prooeael

"!he

world,--th1s shadow of the soul, or other me.--11e8 wide
around.

Its attraotions are the key8 whioh unlook my

thoughts and made me aoquainted with ..,.e1f.
into this resounding tumult. • ••

1 run eagerly

I pierce it. order, I

dissipate its fear, I di8pose of it within the cirouit of
my expanding life."68
Onoe the faculty of the reason, aoting a8 the moral
sentiment, reoeives its flood of Divinity, infinitude occur.
in that partioular individual who has exeroi.ed hi. partioular .egment of the univereal faoulty of the reason.

What

further happens to the nature of that faoulty Emereon pointe
out.

After infinitude 1. aohieved, "Reaeon i8 not to be

distinguished from divine 1.8enoe", for "to oall Reason 'ours'

68Ralpb Waldo Emer8on, "The American Soholar," Selections
from Ralph Waldo ~.rson, ed. Stephen Whioher (Boston, 1951),
~o. 1.J. kIoeoiner 1. of the opinion that Emerson excepted
no one from thi. prooe.s. " . . . although so.e men w111 not
refleot on their oondition, there are none who oannot refleot
and who would consequently be exoluded de facto from partioipation in the better lite • • • • " (F. "5) Gordon agree.
that dThe deepeat oraving of the spirit of man i8 for an Infinite Being oapable of communion with man • • • • " (P. 581)

89
or -human-seems an impert1nen.oe,

80

absolute and confined

it 18,,,69 He repeats this idea in the sermon "Pray Without
Oeasing" when he

88YSI

"Did you not know that the knowledge

of God i8 perfeat and immense • • • that your Reason 1s
God. ,,70

11

I'
j

I'

When, then, in the summer of 1832 Emerson chose personally to defrock himself of the mini8try,71 he did not
80

much deny the divinit,y of Christ as recommend and commend

the Savior for wisely exploiting the tools of His and ever.y

69Jmeraon, Journal., III, 2'5. Woodberry note.
the attitude Emerson wished men to have toward the search
ot the reason tor the Deitys -Thus the wisdom of lite
when 8ummed lie. in a complete and enthusiastio surrender
to Qod alone, suoh that every thought and act shall give
free course to the divine, streaming into the soul and energizing there under the control of the Over-will." (P. 126)
70MOGittert, p. 4.

7lVan Doren, p. 1'4. His rupture with the ministry
resulted from his los. of faith in the Lord-s Supper and
the Divinity of Christ (Ibid.). "Emersonts act of renun~
eiation rdenying the Lor~Supp.rJ was not only important aa
determin1ng the nature of his oareer, but signifioant a180
of the transition ot New England from theologioal dogmatiaa
to romantic liberty." (Trent, I, .,63) Spiller writea: "Hi.
rebellion, when it finally came, was two-tolds against the
last vestiges of ecolesiastical authority over the spiritual
lite of the individual. and against eighteenth oenturY rationalism which had killed s.pirituality, be thought, when it

II
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man'. nature whioh might, and did in His case, procure for
the practitioner infinitude.

As Emerson remarked later

in his Journals, -The history of Jesus is only the hlstor"

ot evel!7 man written large.

'!he name. he be.t... on J eaua

belong to h1a.elf,--Uedlator, Redeemer, savior_ ft72

That

Imeraon aotually believed in eaoh

man'. potential infin-

itude i., therefore, undeniable.

All that man n.ed do to

reali•• it waa exert h1s1ndependenoe and hi. faoultie ••
"!be thinker look. tor God in the direction of the oonBeioueesa. the ohurolnaan out of it.

If you ask the tormer

tor his definition of God, he would ans.er, 'my poss1bl1it,r'.
for hi. definition ot Man, t~ actuality.'ft 7'
denied revelation. The first pointed to a final sohi.. in
whioh each man become. hi. own ohurch, the .econd sought to
provide the rule. tor a ne. and p81'8onal orthodoxy_ In the
end .elf-reliance waa sanctioned by submiasion to the 'Beautiful Necessity_'· (I. ",)
72lmeraon, Jour.n~, V, 478.

7' Ibid., VI,

441.

CHAPTER V
sm1MAl' ION

As we have s.en, the problem here is to establish that
Emerson employed essentially identioal tools--tbe faoulty
of the reason, in its evolutionary form a8 the faculty of
the moral .entiment--in his transient advooacy of the legitimacy 01 a skeptical philosophy and in his inetfaceable
adherence to the dootrine of the infinitude of the private
man.

Both the concept of skeptici" and the infinitude

dootrine are analysed in themselves and in their mutual
relations.
Of the Emersonian work oonsulted, the e.says "Oirolee,"
"Experience,"

"~onta1gne.

or, The Skeptic," and ftFate,ft as

well as the 'author'. Journal. are noted

a8

the appropriately

primary ore from whioh this paper is refined.

Attention 1.

a180 oal1ed to other of b.ereon'. works and to the pertinent

soholarship in the field.
!here is little critioa1 work available which relate.
direotly to the exact problem of this paper.
soholarship,

e.L.

~o

works of

Young'. Emerson'. Montaigne and J.O.
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MoOormiok's "Emerson'. Theory 01 Human Gre.tness,· are
substantially different trom but, admittedly, valuable to
the immediate endeavor.
"Circle." i8 the.."prologue of ,!mer8onian akepticism,
it relates the author's philosophical unsettlement and
tells of his belief in the impermanence of any oredo of
stabilised reality in either the physioal or spiritual
universe.

!he e88ay offers an initial characterisation of

the skeptio a.neither the scoffer, pessimist, .nor

opt~18t.

but as the considerer, the experimenter, and the unsettler.
"Experience" delineates the nature of the individual
man who will have to grapple with the ohasm of divergence
thai exist. bet.een the actual world and ita ideal counter-

part.

It also

pr~~ent8

the 110rds of 1J1t.,

Illusion, Tem-

perament, SUoces.ion, surt80e, surprise, Reality, and
Subjectiveness.

Bach lArd of Life fUnotions a. an agent

that i. t in a variety of ways, aotive in every man'. lite.
The oomposite .ffeot the.e Lords have on eaoh man la unique
in that eaoh man formulate. a different interpretation .s
a result

ot hi. confliot with the world.

~he

Lord SUbjectiveness affects man both in his rela-

tions with other .en and in his relatione with Nature.

In

it. contact with Waturet man's SUbjeotiveness first create.
what it i8 later to interpret.

Similarly, it aftects the

regretfully ainimal knowledge one man haa of another.

Bmer-

80n's oonoept of sin adds to his idea of Subjeotiveness.
!be sinner views sin from the intelleot, the observer of
the sinner views ain from the oon8cienoe.
s1n privation, tha letter, evil.

The tormer finds

The sin viewed from the

oonsotenoe, Emerson holda, oause. oonfu.ion of thought,
resultant is an inore..e in the SUbjeotiveness ot the
indiVidual involved.
!he Lord Illusion repels man from reality, it causes
hi. to di.trust, susp.ot, the intelligenoe offered by hi.
intellect and .......

A. a result, only a aubjective per-

oeption of apparent exi.tanoecan be made.

!he Lord

~6m

perament clo.ely oorresponds1D Lord Illusion in that 'it
cause. both stranger. and friends of man to pre.ent themselves to hi.

88

other than they are.

the oumulus intelleot whioh oan 40

ftO

reality the few times it oontaets it.

It mature., in etf.et,
more than reject

:11

II

1

I
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!he remaining Lords, Surfaoe, SUcoe ••ion, and surprise,
have dual significanoe.

Es.entially they, like the others,

contuse man, but, unlike the others, they create their
chaoa in a more palatable fashion.
\

With the

Lo~.

of Life enumerated, Emerson requests

that the body of skeptical tbought be incorporated into
reoognised oreeds and that it be granted the statue of
acoeptanoe.

Skeptioism, at this time, is doubtlea8 a part

of Emersonts

tho~t.

In tbe Journal entries whioh complement

"~ontaigne,

or, the Skeptic," Emerson reaffirms his inability to estimate
the value of any specific perception.
he accomplishes three thingss

In the essay it.elf,

he lists the kinds of men

in existence, he extraots the skeptic from their midst; and
he constructe, later to destroy via the moral sentiment, the
skeptic's validity in society_
Most men, Emerson believee, are either geniuses or men
of mere talent, or, vicariously, abstraotionists or materialists.

The genius, or abstraotionist, is a man of thought, the

man ecstatioally in love with the Infinite, the Absolute,
and the Real.

S~v.

in Emersonts skeptical period, the
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genius is the praotitioner ot intinitude, he permits hi.
faculty of the rea80n to evolve into the tacult.y ot the
moral .enti.ent.

The man of mere talent, the matertalist,

on the other hand, i8 enamored of the Pinite, the Relative,
or the Apparent.

His talent i8 mere -applioability" with-

out originality, it i8 immeasurably le88 than genius, though
i tiL 'evinc er would not bave one think ao.
Emerson, in hie skeptioal period, believes that both
the genius and the man of mere talent are extremiats.
the mean tGwers the skeptio.
of either side.

Prom

He haa not the exaggeration

He admits tilat man i8 limited in hie abil-

ity to reach God through philo8ophical journey..
that contlicting evidences
truth in anyone cre.d.

pr~hibit

He know.

any chance of univer8al

He neither affirm. nor den188.

The true skeptic, however, is not an ioonoclast.

He

doe. not with bravado strip respectability from oreeds.
Rather, he orbits society and observes from th. distance
what in society actually i . and what actually i8 not.

He

holds the "suspended judgment."
Emerson creates a very stable foundation for the skeptic in aociety,--a foundation that orumbles in the path of

I
1:

1

,

,I
I
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'the moral sentiment, wh1,oh 1s the faculty ot the reason,
extended to its capacity, in union with the Deity.

Emerson's

abrupt resignation from the position ot skeptic is nccept-

'-

able it one realizes tn-a't hie romance with disbelief 1s
merely an evanescent flirtation in
fidelity.

*fo say,

9

life of exquisite

however, that he at

Y10

time gave any

B6rious consideration to skeptioism as a legitimate philosophy is to mock the

sinoe~ty

of the skeptical essays.

As we have asserted, the faoulty of the moral sentiment
1s the faculty of the re••on aotualised.

~h.

reason actual-

lze. when it achleves unity with the Deity; for it institutes,

11,.,'

I:

at the precise moment of unIty, infinitude 1n the achiever.

I
, ,

:1

Notably, the actualized reason not only nourishes infinitude, but evisceratea skepticism as well.

fo sustain the

actualization of the reason, the reali ••r must actively
reoognize and enoourage the new

ll~e

the aoral sentiment

imparts.
The essay "Fate" inters dead skepticism.
sentiment, its slayer, a1de in its burial.

ation.

!he moral

Pste i8 limit-

Left to profper. it clenches man in a vise.

theless, it oannot

withIn its

bo~.ds

Never-

deny existenoe to its
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major opponent, the fr.edom ot the will.

!bis free40m,

however, i8 p088essed and exercised by only a tn souls,
OVer aost souls Fate reigns.
Onoe the will free. itselt in man, the 00rr8Spon41nS
intellect gra.p. the nature of Pate.

!his knowledge debil-

itates rate's constrictive oontrol, and tre. will and Fate
truly co-exist •• the former hacks a't and po_ela the
tounda'tion of 'the lat'ter.
by

Freedom of the will is aohieved

the power of the will, an energy whioh owea it. tribu-

tary existence to the evolutionary growth of the faoulty
of the reason.

The power of the will decimate. Fate and

the Deity poure into man through the faoul ty of the moral
.entiment.

.

!he funotions ot the faoul'ty of the moral. senti.en't.
tben, are the oonnective ti.euea between Emerson t 8 concept
of skeptioism and his dootrine of the infinitude of the
priva'te man.

One of i't. function., aa we have .e.n, employe

a by-product of it. creation, the power of the w111, to
eliminate an impre •• ive toe, Pate, 1n order 'tha't unity w1'th
'the Deit,., 1ta goal, might be reached.
In what .en.e !Beraou thought man God a8 a result of
his union with the neity i. open to thr.e po •• ible inter-

I.

1,1

i

li!1

;I!
:i'
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III,

1

pretationa.

Either man ae an individual is in bimself at

:1

all times God, or each man •• an individual i. one portion
of a (Jod Whom all comprise" or,lastl,.. ae tbis paper contend., eaoh man ie potentially God, bis reali ••tion of tbis
potential dependent upon hi. willingness to achieve it. to

I!
'I

"I

endure the necessary work to achieve it.
Imerson's bedging qualification. of his statementa
on the first two

inte~retatlons

41s.is., in effect, their

tenability and argue, a. a reault, the yalldi't7 of the
tblrd p0881bilit7--that man i. potentiall,. God.
ElDerson -,s ooncept of nature in relation to man' III i%dini tude i. ambiguou8 in the aen.e tbat hi. estimate 0'1 nature
i., as 1t was in his oonfliot with skeptici.m, at onoe benefioial and de.truotive.

For the most part, he believe. that

nature is benefioial and that froll it man, it. core, gather.
God.

'fhat man t 8 app:J'oach to God might be diff10ult, might
be braked by a oonfliot with obstruotions ereoted b,. nature
it ••lf, i8 the major reason for Emerson'. negative interpretation of ,natv.re, whioh peaks in his skeptioal period.

Oircum-

soriptive diatraetions--in a word, Fate,--mole.t man in hi.

~,
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quest for infinitude.

To eradicate distractions, man must,

a8 he do.. in his victory over skepticism, realize his

nature, know,

88

a result, him.elf in addition to the

functions of his faoulties.
The funotion of the faculty of the understanding in
manta .earch for infinitude 18 one of subordination to the

faoul ty of tbe reaaon.'l'he understar.4ing remains in the
baekgroUt'ld and coaplements, makes whole,the reason aa it
evolve. into-the faculty ot the moral sentiment.
!he roots of Emereonts ooncepte ot the reason and the

understanding are lodged in German Romanticism.

They co.e

to the Amerioan Transoendentalist through hi. personal
aoquaintance w1 th, and reading oft the English Romantios.
Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Oarlyle introduoe him to
Goethe, Swedeborg, and

SpinOD,

Kan~,

among numereus others.

From Wordsworth Emerson no doubt reoeive. influence in
his belief 1n the interpenetration of God 1n nature.

!hrough

Oarlyle, he meet. all of Goethe and aome of Kant, and 1.
exposed to the vaoillating oonoept of the »eity--peraonal
or impersonal--that aturdily Kl'ew in Emerson' s skepti.oal
period.
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Despite Emerson'. ownership of a penoil-scrawled tranalation of Kant's Oritique

~

Pure Reason, Ooleridge. oritics

agree, brings Emerson to grips with the German Romantic'.
ooncepta of the reason and the understanding.

Coleridge

lives Emerson hi$ personal oorruptions of the Xantian ideas,
and Emerson proceeds further to oorrupt th.. , or, rather, to
mould them to his own uee.

In any event, he leans heavily

on Coleridge'. analysis of their natures.
On various points on the faoulty of the reason, Emereon and Coleridge, in the general sense, agree.

~hey

believe that the faoulty of the reason reveals God

~

both
man,

reveals the unity of all proximate t:ruth. in <J.od, and reve.la
the nature ot the oonduot that oorresponds correctly to the
God known.

Similarly, they both hold that the reason 1s an

intuitive, the understanding a systematically logical faoulty.
The latter funotion. in all men, the tormer in a fe••
Emerson personally stresses that only the faoulty of
the reason actualized--the faoulty of the moral

sent1m.n~-

has the ability to see God in the unity of existenoe ana
that only it can allow God to pour through and permeate man
who, 1n thankful anticipation, realize. infinitude.

And as

101
his

bou~ wi~h

skeptioism assure., the death of Fate must be

a faot before thie infinitude can be realized.
ation in the
than

i~

intin1~e

Ita expir-

assertion ocours no more ea811y

did in the 4i88i88&1 of akeptioi...

Again the

power of the will, which activates during the birth of the
moral 8entiment, disarms Fate and
Deity.

pre~·.s

for the onrush of

The moral aenti.ent--tbe reason 81gnal17 taut--

aceepta the Deity. knows its

inftni~.,

and

oel.bra~ ••

ita

aohievement of Emerson'a definition of Go4--"my possibility."
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